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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

CICERO AS A PHILOSOPHICAL WRITER

Studies in De Finibus Book I

by



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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1971

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and
recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance,
a thesis entitled

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quirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Doctor Hermansen, my supervisor, for his time spent in discussing my topic and reviewing the written work; for his many helpful suggestions; and for his encouragement. Miss MacKenzie also deserves many thanks for her suggestions and active encouragement during Doctor Hermansen's absence during the summer months. My husband, Ted, also receives many thanks for his great patience, encouragement, and help with typing.

INTRODUCTION

The following paper is a study of Cicero and his philosophical writings, with particular concentration on De Finibus I and II, especially I. Part I consists of a collection of Cicero's own statements from his various writings, about philosophy, his feelings toward it, his use of it, his writing and studies, purpose for writing, and method. A discussion of the source for Book I follows, which I have based on R. Hirzels's work. Using Book I, I have then tried to show how Cicero may have used his source material to create an original work. Part III is a brief observation of some features of Cicero's philosophical language and style as found in de Finibus I and II.

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PART I

REFERENCES FROM CICERO'S WORKS WHICH INDICATE
HIS VIEWS ON PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN CICERO'S LIFE¹

In his many writings, particularly the letters and philosophical works, Cicero freely expresses his feelings about philosophy and speaks of his devotion to studies, why he turns to these, what value he places on them. Cicero had good schooling in his youth, thanks to his father, and was introduced to philosophy early, then turned to it throughout his whole life. At Rome in 79-8 he heard Phaedrus the Epicurean, and Philo the Academic. Diodotus the Stoic was a resident in Cicero's house for some time until he died there. At Athens Cicero heard Zeno the Epicurean and Antiochus the Academic, a man who seems to have had a great influence on Cicero's thinking. Then in Rhodes he heard Posidonius. Cicero often refers to these philosophers with whom he came into contact:

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| <u>De. Nat. Deor.</u> I 6 | Nos autem nec subito coepimus philosophari nec mediocrem a primo tempore aetatis in eo studio operam curamque consumpsimus et cum minime videbamus, tum maxime philosophabamur, quod et orationes declarant refertae philosophorum sententiis et doctissimorum hominum familiaritates quibus semper domus nostra floruit, et principes illi Diodotus Philo Antiochus Posidonius a quibus instituti sumus. |
| <u>De fin.</u> I 6 | Legimus...multos alios in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium. ² |
| <u>De Nat. Deor.</u> I 123 | "Verius est igitur, nimirum ium illud quod familiaris omnium nostrum Posidonius disseruit...." |
| <u>De Fin.</u> I 16 | "Nisi mihi Phaedrum", inquam, "mentitum aut Zenonem putas, quorum utrumque audivi,...omnes mihi Epicuri sententiae satis notae sunt." ³ |

Tusc. V 22

Nam ista mihi et cum Antiocho saepe et cum Aristo nuper, cum Athenis imperator apud eum deversarer, dissensio fuit:...

The first quotation is a direct statement about Cicero's involvement in philosophy and the philosophers with whom he associated. If his speeches are full of philosophical maxims, the reverse is also true, that his philosophical works are full of forensic language, metaphors, and anecdotes. I will discuss these in Chapter VII.

De Nat. Deor. I 59

Zenonem, quem Philo noster coryphaeum appellare Epicureorum solebat, cum Athenis essem audiebam frequenter, et quidem ipso auctore Philone....

Brut. 306

Atque huic anno proximus Sulla consule et Pompeio fuit (89 B.C.)...cum princeps Academiae Philo cum Atheniensium optimatibus Mithridatico bello domo profugisset Romamque venisset, totum ei me tradidi admirabili quodam, ad philosophiam studio concitatus,....

Ibid. 308-9

Triennium fere fuit (87-4) urbs sine armis, ...At vero ego hoc tempore omni noctes et dies in omnium doctrinarum meditatione versabar. Eram cum Stoico Diodoto, qui cum habitavisset apud me mecumque vixisset, nuper est domi meae mortuus.

Ibid. 315

Cum venissem Athenas, sex mensis cum Antiocho veteris Academiae nobilissimo et prudentissimo philosopho fui studiumque philosophiae numquam intermissum a primaque adulescentia cultum et semper auctum hoc rursus summo auctore et doctore renovavi.

In writing about philosophy, Cicero finds it necessary to continually remind the reader that he has studied philosophy from his youth and has always loved his studies. This sincere statement indicates that

Cicero turned to philosophy and his studies throughout his life whenever he had time. However, he regrets that he did not always have as much time for studies as he did in his earlier years.

While in actual fact there never seems to have been any question that Cicero's political duties took first place whenever possible, politics and studies were two conflicting as well as complementary sides of his life.⁴ These two sides of life make up Cicero's definition of the nature of man, which he acknowledges as being that of Aristotle:

De Fin. II 40

...sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et ad agendum esse natum,...

Ibid. II 41

... nos beatam vitam...agendo aliquid considerandove quaeramus.

In actual fact, philosophy was a beloved pursuit, to be followed during periods of otium, that is, spare time after politics. Philosophy was a diversion for him when he was not able to serve his country as a statesman, and offered another way for him to serve his country at these times: (De.Off. II 3-4)

Primum enim, ut stante re publica facere solebamus, in agendo plus quam in scribendo operae poneremus, deinde ipsis scriptis non ea, quae nunc, sed actiones nostras mandaremus, ut saepe fecimus. Cum autem res publica...nulla esset omnino,...nihil agere autem cum animus non posset, in his studiis ab initio versatus aetatis existimavi honestissime molestias posse deponi, si me ad philosophiam rettulissem. Cui cum multum adulescens discendi causa temporis tribuissem, postea quam honoribus inservire coepi meque totum rei publicae tradidi, tantum erat philosophiae loci, quantum superfuerat amicorum et rei publicae temporibus; id autem omne consumebatur in legendo, scribendi otium non erat.

Here Cicero states that philosophy had to occupy the time left over from more important matters. This is not to say that Cicero did not regret that he did not have more time for studies, but only that he felt his first duties lay in public affairs. In the Pro Archia Poeta Oratio 12f., Cicero discusses literature as a relaxation in leisure time, but not to the exclusion of public duties; literature also helps the orator and sets examples of moral standards. In his dedicatory letter to the Academica, addressed to Varro, (Ad Fam. IX 8.2), Cicero wishes that the affairs of state would be settled so that he could study in leisure, although he admits that in that case, he would be too involved in state affairs to find the time. He complains that his studies are all he has now:

Atque utinam quietis temporibus, atque aliquo, si non bono at saltem certo statu civitatis haec inter nos studia exercere possemus! Quamquam tam quidem vel aliae quaedam rationes honestas nobis et curas et actiones darent; nunc autem quid est sine his cur vivere velimus? Mihi vero cum his ipsis vix, his autem detractis ne vix quidem.

In his first book of the Academica, (I 11) Cicero explains that he did not have much time for studies when he was busy in state affairs, but now turns to them as a diversion when he is not able to act in public affairs:

Ego autem, ...dum me ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura sed quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat, haec inclusa habebam, et ne obsolescerent renovabam cum licebat legendo; nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus vulnere et administratione rei publicae liberatus doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et oti oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico.

Another passage found in a letter to Varro, written in 46 B.C., also speaks of philosophy as a "medicine":

Fam. IX 3.2

...tamen artes nostrae nescio quomodo nunc uberiores fructus ferre videntur, quam olim ferebant, sive quia nulla nunc in re alia acquiescimus, sive quod gravitas morbi facit, ut medicinae egeamus, eaque nunc appareat; cuius vim non sentiebamus, cum valebamus.

Cicero also finds solace in his studies against the grief at the death of Tullia, a fortunae gravis vulnus. This sorrow is also given as a reason in the next quotation (De Nat. Deor. I 9) where it is called fortunae magna et gravis iniuria.

When Cicero turned to philosophy as a pastime during political inactivity, he felt it was a compensation that he could serve his country with his studies and writing:

De Nat. Deor. I 9

Sin autem quis requirit quae causa nos inpulerit ut haec tam sero litteris mandaremus, nihil est quod expedire tam facile possimus. Nam cum otio langueremus et is esset rei publicae status ut eam unius consilio atque cura gubernari nec esse esset, primum ipsius rei publicae causa philosophiam nostris hominibus explicandam putavi, magni existimans interesse ad decus et ad laudem civitatis res tam gravis tamque praeclaras Latinis etiam litteris contineri; eoque me minus instituti mei paenitet quod facile sentio quam multorum non modo discendi sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim....quo in genere (Latine) tantum profecisse videmur ut a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur. Hortata etiam est ut me ad haec conferrem animi aegritudo fortunae magna et gravi commota iniuria;...

Just before the quoted passage he tells how he has studied philosophy from youth,⁵ and then that he turned to it when he was excluded from politics. He feels he can help his countrymen by bringing them knowledge of Greek ideas, and by enriching Latin. Cicero often boasts how he is continually serving his country in every way possible:

De Fin. I 10

Ego vero, quoniam forensibus operis, laboribus, periculis non deseruisse mihi videor praesidium in quo a populo Romano locatus sum, debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, in eo quoque elaborare ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei,...

De Div. II 1

Quaerenti mihi multumque et cogitanti quanam re possem prodesse quam plurimis, ne quando intermitterem consulere rei p., nulla maior occurebat, quam si optimarum artium vias traderem meis civibus;...

Farther on, he repeats the idea of studies taking the place of political activity and he expresses the hope that some youths might benefit from his writings, that reading his books might help them through troubled times as they have helped him:

Ibid. II 4-7

...nisi quae causa gravior obstitisset nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur qui non Latinis litteris inlustratus pateret. Quod enim munus rei p. adferre maius meliusque possumus quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem, his praesertim moribus atque temporibus,...Nec vero id effici posse confido, quod ne postulandum quidem est, ut omnes adulescentesse ad haec studia convertant: pauci utinam,...Magnificum illud etiam Romanisque hominibus gloriosum, ut Graecis de philosophia litteris non egeant;...Ac mihi quidem ex-

plicandae philosophiae causam adtulit casus gravis civitatis, cum in armis civilibus nec tueri meo more rem p. nec nihil agere poteram nec quid potius, quod quidem me dignum esset, agerem reperi-
bam....Id enim ipsum a Platone philosophiaque didiceram, naturales esse quasdam conversiones rerum publicarum,...philosophiam nobis pro reip. procuratione substitutam putabamus. etc.

There is a strong feeling here that philosophy is a substitute for political activity while it helps both to bear hard times and to understand them. In this way philosophical study is complementary to political activity. He even expresses gratefulness for the opportunity to pass his learning on:

De Off. II 5

Maximis igitur in malis hoc tamen boni assecuti videmur, ut ea litteris mandaremus, quae nec erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignissima. Quid enim est, per deos, optabilius sapientia, quid praestantius, quid homini melius, quid homine dignius? Hanc igitur qui expetunt philosophi nominantur,....

In the following quotation Cicero expresses the feeling that it is actually his duty to serve his countrymen not only in politics but in the other way in which he is capable, that of passing on his knowledge which he gained in his schooling, by listening to philosophers, and by his vast reading during periods when he had no time for writing:

Tusc. I 5

Philosophia iacuit usque ad hanc aetatem nec ullum habuit lumen litterarum Latinarum quae illustranda et excitanda nobis est, ut, si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, otiosi.

In times of trouble, when Cicero is feeling dejected because politics fails him, his letters to Atticus reveal a feeling that perhaps philosophy is more worthy of his time than politics after all, and that philosophy really is better suited to his nature. It is clear that philosophy certainly takes a close second place after politics in Cicero's life. And his studies are a relief from civic activity. In 61 B.C., Cicero complains to Atticus:

Att. I 16, 13

Sed heus tu! videsne consulatum illum nostrum quem Curio antea ἀποθέωσιν vocabat, si hic factus erit, fabam mimum futurum? Quare, ut opinor, φιλοσοφητέον id quod tu facis, et istos consulatus non flocci faciteon.

During a state of political turmoil in 59, Cicero writes similarly:

Att. II 13, 2

Credas mihi velim, neminem adhuc offendi, qui haec tam lente, quam ego fero, ferret, Quare, mihi crede, φιλοσοφῶμεν . Iratus tibi possum dicere nihil esse tanti.

Feeling depressed Cicero writes, with a tone of self pity: (59 B.C.)

Att. II 5,2

Sed quid ego haec, quae cupio deponere et toto animo atque omni cura φιλοσοφεῖν ? Sic, inquam, in animo est; vellem ab initio, nunc vero, quoniam, quae putavi esse praeclara, (Political glory) expertus sum quam essent inania, cum omnibus Musis rationem habere cogito.

In 55, Cicero writes:

Atti. IV 10, 1

Sed mehercule a ceteris oblectationibus deseror et voluptatibus propter rem publicam sic litteris sustentor et recreor maloque in illa tua sedecula, quam habes sub imagine Aristotelis, sedere quam in istorum sella curuli...

and in 54 B.C.:

Atti. IV 18, 2

Multa mihi dant solacia...quaeque vita maxime est ad naturam, ad eam me refero, ad litteras et studia nostra...vobis (Atticus and Quintus) ἐμφιλοσοφῆσαι possum.

In 45 B.C., Cicero expresses his dependence on philosophy:

Atti. XIII 10, 1

Quamquam hoc (the fact that he is a consular) nullam ad partem valet scilicet, mihi praesertim, qui non minus bene actum cum illis (his dead friends)⁶ putem. Quid enim sumus aut quid esse possumus? domin an foris? Quod nisi mihi hoc venisset in mentem, scribere ista nescio quae, quo verterem me, non haberem.

The idea that philosophy is worthy of his time is extended to the belief that philosophy is worth of man, and the best thing for him. This is clear in the quotation on page 7 from De Off. II 5. In the quotation from Acad. I 11 on page 4, it is notable that philosophy is not just a pastime but an honestissima pastime.

For Cicero, philosophy and studies and writing in general, seem to be an occupation of second choice, when no means of action, that is in politics, as open to him. At such times it serves as a diversion and a solace, a way to fill the time in the best way possible, by

studies which became familiar to him in his youthful studies. Cicero must always feel that he is helping his countrymen, and writing seems to him to be a way to do so. One cannot help but get the impression that while Cicero is certainly reluctant to quit state affairs, he is never really reluctant to turn to his studies. As he himself says, they seem to be suited to his nature, he seems to feel at home with them. And his intervals of study must have given him the relaxation and the strength of mind to carry on. He calls his philosophical writings "minime nobis iniucundus labor" (De Fin. I 3). Contrasted with playwriting, philosophy is a gravissima res (De Fin. I 4). In a passage in Tusc. V 5-6 Cicero gives credit to philosophy for all good life and growth:

O vitae philosophia dux, o virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum! quid non modo nos, sed omnino vita hominum sine te esse potuisset? Tu urbes peperisti,...ad te confugimus, a te opem petimus, tibi nos, ut antea magna ex parte, sic nunc penitus totosque tradimus. Est autem unus dies bene et ex praeceptis tuis actus peccanti immortalitati anteponendus. Cuius igitur potius opibus utamur quam tuis, quae et vitae tranquillitatem largita nobis es et terro rem mortis sustulisti?

Philosophy is a noble occupation for man:

De Off. II 5

Quid enim est, per deos, optabilius sapientia, quid praestantius, quid homini melius, quid homine dignius?...nec quicquam aliud est philosophia, si interpretari velis, praeter studium sapientiae.⁷

In a letter to Cato, Cicero describes philosophy:

Fam XV 4.16

...qua nec mihi carior ulla umquam res in vita fuit, nec hominum generi maius a dis munus ullum est datum.

Cicero repeatedly refers to philosophy as a peace for the mind and the best way to achieve virtue:

De Off. II 6

Nam sive oblectatio quaeritur animi requiesque curarum, quae conferri cum eorum studiis potest, qui semper aliquid anquirunt, quod spectet et valeat ad bene beateque vivendum? sive ratio constantiae virtutisque ducitur, aut haec ars est aut nulla omnino, per quam eas assequamur.

This brings me to the whole purpose of philosophy which is "bene et beate vivere", or εὐδαιμονία . To discover how to live well and happily is the main purpose of the inquiry in De Finibus:

De Fin. II 42

...vitam beatam, de quo omnis haec quaestio est.

Ibid. I 11

Quid est enim in vita tanto opere quaerendum quam cum omnia in philosophia, tum id quod his libris quaeritur, qui sit finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum quo sint omnia bene vivendi recteque faciendi consilia referenda;...

The importance of this aim comes up again and again. For example, in talking about sensualists, Cicero opposes sensualism by saying:

De Fin. II 23

...hos ergo asotos bene quidem vivere aut beate numquam dixerim.

Torquatus says:

Ibid I 42

...fatendum est summum esse bonum iucunde vivere.

This concept is brought up by Torquatus again in I 14; 54; 65; 71. For him, Epicurus is the man who shows the way to this end. He speaks of "vivendi artem" as being the most important art to learn (I 72) and that other so-called education does not contribute to "quo melius viveremus". Cicero calls the Kyriai Doxai:

<u>Ibid.</u> II 20	...quasi maxime ratas, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntia- tae sententiae.
--------------------	--

The following are other references:

- | | |
|-------|--|
| I 5 | "...quae...de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt..." |
| II 41 | reference to bene vivendum as a goal. |
| II 89 | reference to vivere beate, beatum esse, beatae vitae. |
| II 90 | reference to beate vivendum. |
| II 92 | reference to beata vita, beatum esse. |

To live happily is the aim of every philosophy:

- | | |
|-------|---|
| II 86 | Quoniam igitur omnis summa philosophiae ad beate vivendum refertur, idque unum expetentes homines se ad hoc studium contulerunt,... |
|-------|---|

Reid says⁸ that ars vivendi (I 42) (τέχνη τοῦ βίου or περὶ τοῦ βίου) is a commonplace definition of philosophy in post-Aristotelian writers. In books I and II of De Finibus, it is the Epicureans and Cicero who are seeking the happy life. I 86-95, the final part of the philosophical discussion of book I, is a discussion of happiness.

Cicero takes this concept, that the aim of philosophy is to teach how to live well and happily, literally, since philosophy is of no use to him unless it is of practical value in life.⁹ Much of the above discussion and quotations illustrates this in that Cicero does use philosophy to make his life happier and more meaningful, and wants to pass his learning on to help others in the same way. The following quotation illustrates that Cicero does apply philosophy to life:

<u>De Nat. Deor.</u> I 7	...si omnia philosophiae praecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestitisse quae ratio et doctrina praescripserit.
--------------------------	--

The purpose of De Officiis is to instruct Cicero's son in the value and application of a particular field of philosophy. The following quotations summarize this attitude of applying it to life:

<u>De Off.</u> I 4	Nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia et utilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata, latissime patere videntur ea quae de officiis tradita ab illis et praecepta sunt. Nulla enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis, neque forensibus neque domesticis in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare officio potest, in eoque et colendo sit a vitae est honestas omnis et negligendo turpitudine.
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<u>Ibid.</u> III 5	Sed cum tota philosophia, mi Cicero, frugifera et fructuosa nec ulla pars eius inculta ac deserta sit, tum nullus feracior in ea locus est nec uberior quam de officiis, a quibus constanter honesteque vivendi praecepta ducuntur.
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Philosophy has a specific use in the study of oratory:

Orator 14-16

Positum sit igitur in primis quod post magis intellegetur, sine philosophia non posse effici quem quaerimus eloquentem, non ut in ea tamen omnia sint, sed ut sic adiuvet ut palaestra histrionem;...Nam nec latius atque copiosius de magnis variisque rebus sine philosophia potest quisquam dicere...nec vero sine philosophorum disciplina genus et speciem cuiusque rei cernere neque eam definiendo explicare nec tribuere in partis possumus nec iudicare quae vera quae falsa sint neque cernere consequentia, repugnantia videre, ambigua distinguere. Quid dicam de natura rerum, cuius cognitio magnam oratori suppeditat copiam? An credas de vita, de officiis, de virtute, de moribus sine multa earum ipsarum rerum disciplina aut dici aut intellegi posse?

Ibid. 118

Nec vero a dialecticis modo sit instructus sed habeat omnis philosophiae notos ac tractatos locos. Nihil enim de religione, nihil de morte, nihil de pietate, nihil de caritate patriae, nihil de bonis rebus aut malis, nihil de virtutibus aut vitiis, nihil de officio, nihil de dolore, nihil de voluptate, nihil de perturbationibus animi et erroribus, quae saepe cadunt in causas et ieiunius aguntur, nihil, inquam, sine ea scientia quam dixi graviter, ample, copiose dici et explicari potest.

This practical attitude towards philosophy is also evident in Cicero's belief that experience is the real proof:

De Fin. II 16

...efficere non possit ut cuiquam qui ipsi sibi notus sit, hoc est qui suam naturam sensumque perspexerit, vacuitas doloris et voluptas idem esse videatur...Quis est enim qui non videat haec esse in natura rerum tria?

Ibid. II 107

Nihilne te delectat umquam,...te igitur,
Torquate, ipsum per se nihil delectat?
etc.

Many deeds of great or public men are discussed in De Fin. 55 ff. with the intent of proving that Epicureanism has never been adhered to by any of these great men and could be of no use to them, further illustrating the practical attitude towards philosophy:

Ibid II 67

Quod autem patrocinium aut quae ista
causa est voluptatis quae nec testes ullos
e claris viris nec laudatores poterit ad-
hibere?

In a letter to Cato, which I quoted above, Cicero, speaking of philosophy, says:

Fam. XV 4.16

Haec...societas studiorum atque artium
nostrarum,...quae quibusdam oti esse ac
desidia videtur, in forum atque in rem
publicam atque in ipsam aciem paene dedux-
imus,...

There is an implication here that Cicero was the one who made a practical study out of philosophy, although one must remember that he is exaggerating here to win Cato's favour. The following quotation will illustrate that there was such a thing as an idealistic philosophy as opposed to a more practical one:

Att. II 16, 3

...tanta controversia est Dicaearcho,
familiari tuo, cum Theophrasto, amico
meo, ut ille tuus τὸν πρακτικὸν βίον
longe omnibus anteponat, hic autem τὸν
θεωρητικὸν,...

Cicero takes τὸν πρακτικὸν a step farther than Plato. Although the latter did write about ethics and politics, both "practical" disciplines, he wrote about idealistic, unrealizable abstractions, and for an audience of fellow philosophers. Cicero, on the other hand, believed that philosophy must be useful for the ordinary man in everyday life, and tried to make it so.

CHAPTER II

CICERO'S PURPOSE FOR WRITING AND METHOD OF COMPOSITION

Since Cicero has so often been criticized for being a copyist, a mere translator, and unoriginal, it is worthwhile to consider what he himself says about his purpose for writing and about his method. It is clear from the discussion of Chapter I that studying and writing served as leisure time occupations and took Cicero's mind from troubles. The quotations on pages 5-7 demonstrate Cicero's desire to be of service to his countryman by conveying Greek thought for them in Latin. This does not imply any strict translation but it clearly means that it is not always or only his own thoughts which Cicero intends to write about. In fact, he has an answer for those who wish to know his own opinions:

De Nat. Deor. I 10	Qui autem requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est;...Quin etiam obest plerumque iis qui discere volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum iudicium adhibere, id habent ratum quod ab eo quem probant iudicatum vident. Nec vero probare soleo id quod de Pythagoreis accepimus, quos ferunt, si quid adfirmarent in disputando, cum eis quaereretur quare ita esset, respondere solitos "Ipse dixit"; "ipse" autem erat Pythagoras: tantum opinio praeiudicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret auctoritas. etc.
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Teachers must not dogmatize: this practise has a suffocating effect on the students' intellect, often making them quote like parrots rather than think for themselves; students should use their own judgment. This seems to be a strong belief with Cicero since he brings it

up again and again. He wishes to present all sides of a question in order that the student may judge for himself. Therefore his philosophical works present different views on a given topic, along with refutations. The following quotation is a statement of this method:

De Nat. Deor. I 9

...ea vero ipsa nulla ratione melius frui potui (relieve his sorrow on the death of Tullia) quam si me non modo ad legendos libros sed etiam ad totam philosophiam pertractandam dedissem. Omnes autem eius partes atque omnia membra tum facillume noscuntur cum totae quaestiones scribendo explicantur; est enim admirabilis quaedam continuatio seriesque rerum, ut alia es alia nexa et omnes inter se aptae conligataeque videantur.

In introducing the same topic of the gods, Cicero states his belief that there are many different views:

Ibid. I 1

De qua tum variae sunt doctissimorum hominum tamque discrepantes sententiae, ut magno argumento esse debeat causam et principium philosophiae esse inscientiam, prudenterque Academicos a rebus incertis ad sensum cohibuisse: quid est enim temeritate turpius? aut quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantia quam aut falsum sentire aut quid non satis explore perceptum sit et cognitum sine ulla dubitatione defendere.

It appears that Cicero belongs to those "alii autem, quibus ego assentior," (De Fin. I 31) mentioned by Torquatus, who believe that argument and discussion is necessary to find truth. It is this attitude of the Academics, allowing the follower to reason and to withhold judgement which draws Cicero to them. He defends the Academics on this issue in De Nat. Deor. I 10-12 incl. They, as Cicero, acknowledge that it is

difficult to discover the truth:

11-12

...nam si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto maius omnis? quod facere iis necesse est quibus propositum est veri reperiendi causa et contra omnis philosophos et pro omnibus dicere. Cuius rei tantae tamque difficilis facultatem consecutum esse me non profiteor, secutum esse prae me fero.

Ibid. I 60

Ut enim modo dixi, omnibus fere in rebus sed maxime in physicis quid non sit citius quam quid sit dixerim.

Cicero follows with a story about Simonides, who is said to have delayed answering a question because the longer he thought about it the more obscure it seemed. Cicero's preferences are indicated in other works:

Tusc. II 5

...nos qui sequimur probabilia nec ultra quam ad id, quod veri simile occurrit, progredi possumus, et refellere sine pertinacia et refelli sine iracundia parati sumus.

Ibid. II 9

Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset quid in quaque re veri simile esset inveniri, sed etiam quod esset ea maxima dicendi exercitatio;...

This same dislike of dogmatism is probably implied in De. Fin. II 1:

..."Primum," inquam, "deprecor ne me tamquam philosophum putetis scholam vobis aliquam explicaturum, quod ne in ipsis quidem philosophis magno opere umquam probavi.

So in Tusc., where Cicero uses a question-answer method between student and teacher, he begins the answer of a question by saying:

V 83

Utamur igitur libertate, qua nobis solis in philosophia licet uti, quorum oratio nihil ipsa iudicat, sed habetur in omnes partes, ut ab aliis possit ipsa per sese nullius auctoritate adiuncta iudicari.

The idea of letting each person decide his own beliefs for himself is carried through in Cicero's advice to his son:

De Off. I 2

...de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio-nihil enim impedio,...

In the introduction to book II of De Officiis Cicero explains and defends the methods of the Academics, and again expresses the belief that truth is hard to know; and he disparages dogmatizing:

Ibid. II 8

Quid est igitur quod me impediat ea, quae probabilia mihi videantur, sequi, quae contra, improbare atque affirmandi arrogantiam vitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapientia dissidet plurimum? Contra autem omnia disputatur a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere non posset, nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio. Sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror, diligenter.

Returning to De Finibus in particular, its structure clearly conforms to a presentation-refutation scheme, the aim being to present the different views on:

I 11

...qui sit finis, etc. Qua de re cum sit inter doctissimos summa dissensio,...

I 12

Nos autem hanc omnem quaestionem de finibus bonorum et malorum fere a nobis explicatam esse his litteris arbitramur, in quibus, quantum potuimus, non modo quid nobis probaretur sed etiam quid a singulis philosophiae disciplinis dicere-
tur persecuti sumus.

Books I and II respectively take viewpoints for and against Epicureanism on the topic of De Finibus, books III and IV respectively for and against Stoicism, and book V on the Academics. Throughout the main lines of Epicurean argument in books I and II, Cicero often makes a reference to the opinions of another philosopher. In book II 19-44, Cicero compares Epicurean beliefs with those of other schools.

The actual form of De Finibus is a combination of dialogue or question-answer, and continuous exposition.⁹ Torquatus says:

I 29

Sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari.

In the passage from de Finibus II 1 quoted on page 15 Cicero states his disapproval of a formal lecture, (scholam) which he says Socrates himself never used. There follows a brief summary of various methods, ending with Cicero's own preference:

II 3-4

Nos commodius agimus. Non enim solum Torquatus dixit quid sentiret sed etiam cur. Ego autem arbitror, quamquam admodum delectatus sum eius oratione perpetua, tamen commodius, cum in rebus singulis insistas et intellegas quid quisque concedat, quid abnuat, ex rebus concessis concludi quod velis et ad exitum perveniri. ... Omnis autem...in quaerendo, quae via quadam et ratione habetur, oratio praescribere primum debet...ut inter quos describitur conveniat quid sit id de quo describatur. Hoc positum in Phaedro a Platone probavit Epicurus sensitque in omni disputatione id fieri oportere.

A question-answer type of discussion follows until Torquatus pleads (II 17): "Finem,...interrogandi, si videtur; quod quidem ego a principio ita me malle dixeram,...dialecticas captiones". To which Cicero answers:

Obsequar igitur voluntati tuae dicamque si potero rhetorice, sed hac rhetorica philosophorum, non nostra illa forensi, quam necesse est, cum populariter loquatur, esse interdum paulo hebetiorem.

Cicero does speak of the relationship of his work to Greek sources and makes some implications about his views on translating; these views are determined by his general purpose of writing, and influence his method of composition. Verto, in the sense of to translate, means to interpret, adapt, or paraphrase, without implying strict word for word translation. Thus Cicero's choice is between representing the Greek original, simply as an interpretes, or using the Greek as a basis to which he adds his own ideas. The following quotation acknowledges his indebtedness to Greek sources:

Qu. Fr. I 1.28

Non enim me hoc iam dicere pudebit,... nos ea, quae secuti sumus, his studiis et artibus esse adeptos, quae sint nobis Graeciae monumentis disciplinisque tradita.

He likes to illustrate his work with quotations from poets and is not ashamed to give translations of Greek poets where Latin poets fail him:

Tusc. II 26

...studiose equidem utor nostris poetis, sed, sicubi illi defecerunt, verti etiam multa de Graecis, ne quo ornamento in hoc genere disputationis careret Latina oratio.

However, according to Cicero's own words, he does not merely translate, but does choose to augment the source material with his own thoughts and structure:

De Fin. I 6

Quid si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus....

Ibid. I 7

Quamquam si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem ut verterunt nostri poetae fabulas, male, credo, mererer de meis civibus si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. Sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen ne faciam interdictum puto. Locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam,...cum inciderit ut id apte fieri possit;...

While Cicero here says that he is not averse to simply translating, he certainly implies that this is not his only procedure. Both of the above quotations are non-committal, leaving Cicero free to use his sources in different ways, according to what he finds best for any given instance. In De Officiis, Cicero makes a similar statement about his method:

I 6

Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus.

So Cicero does not consider himself simply an interpres.

Cicero also states his views on how to express Greek which he does wish to translate:

Ibid III 15

Nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum quod idem declaret magis usitatum; equidem soleo etiam, quod uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere.¹¹ Et tamen puto concedi nobis oportere ut Graeco verbo utamur, si quando minus occurret Latinum,...

Here Cicero rejects word for word translation, as being the method of a bad translator, and states his intention to use such freedom of language as is necessary to make his writing intelligible to the Roman reader. He suggests approval of using transliterated Greek words where no suitable Latin word exists. And indeed he does use well established technical Greek terms (see Chapter VII). He does, however, object to using Greek in the course of Latin writing:

Tusc. I 15

Dicam (sententiam Epicarmi), si potero, Latine. Scis enim me Graece loqui in Latino sermone non plus solere quam in Graeco Latine.

In speaking of constancy and uniformity in life, Cicero uses an example of language:

De Off. I 111

Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui notus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic...

As I try to demonstrate in Chapter VI on Cicero's use of his sources, Cicero does not merely translate, but uses Greek source material in an arrangement which suits his purpose. No discussion of Cicero's method can be complete without the much quoted sentence found in Att. XII 52,3:

De lingua Latina securi es animi. Dices "Qui talia conscribis?"
'Απόγραφα sunt, minore labore fiunt; verba tantum adfero,
quibus abundo.

This light-hearted statement is typical of Cicero's boastful modesty.

However, I do not believe that these works were created without some effort. For instance, it appears that Cicero took great care in having his facts right:

<u>Att.</u> XII 5b	Cicero asks Atticus to look up some information for him about a fact he is not certain of in the Brutus.
<u>Ibid.</u> XIII 13, 1	Cicero revised the entire Academica because the first version did not satisfy him.
<u>Ibid.</u> XIII 21, 3	Cicero would like Atticus to change a Latin translation of a word in the Academica, where he has discovered the particular meaning of the Greek word.
<u>Ibid.</u> XIII 21a, 1	Cicero is worried "ne et ἀδολόρωτα habeat Balbus..."
<u>Ibid.</u> XVI 3, 1	Cicero discusses the revision, additions, and corrections of the <u>de Senectute</u> , which he refers to by the opening lines, "O Tite, si quid ego."

It is important to Cicero to use the correct word in a given situation. Many instances can be found in De Finibus in which Cicero discusses the meaning of two similar words or the connotations of a word:

<u>De Fin.</u> II 45 ff.	discussion of <u>honestum</u> .
<u>Ibid.</u> II 27	Difference in meaning between <u>desideria</u> and <u>cupiditas</u> (ἐπιθυμία).
<u>Ibid.</u> II 24-5	difference in meaning between <u>bene</u> and <u>libenter</u> .
<u>Ibid.</u> II 10	discussion of meaning of <u>varietas</u> .

CHAPTER III

ON THE MEANING OF THE TITLE

There is a question about the precise meaning of the title De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum.¹² Does Cicero mean "on the two extremes of good and evil", or "various views about the ends of good and evil"? What is the connotation of finis? Is the Greek equivalent $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\epsilon\lambda\omega\tilde{\nu}$ or $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, both of which are found as titles of Greek works? A similar work by Epicurus is called $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$.¹³ Cicero himself calls his work $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\epsilon\lambda\omega\tilde{\nu}$ $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\tau\alpha\chi\iota\nu$ (Att. XIII 12, 3), which seems to indicate a collection of views on the subject; and $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}$ $\tau\epsilon\lambda\omega\tilde{\nu}$ (Att. XIV 19, 4).

Philippson says:

Finis ($\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$) bedeutet hier nicht Ziel (Zweck), sondern das Höchste, Äusserste;...

according to which concept, he says, finis bonorum means "the highest good" and finis malorum means "the highest evil". He bases this conclusion on a Greek passage in Philodemus' Rhetorica (1218, 8ff., Sudh.):

$\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ $\tau\omicron$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ [$\tau\omicron$ $\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\nu\epsilon\tau\omicron\nu$] $\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{o}\sigma\omicron\nu$ $\acute{o}\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}$
 $\tau\tilde{\omega}$ $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota$ $\tau\tilde{\omega}\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\omega\tilde{\nu}$, $\tau\omicron$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ [$\tau\omicron$ $\phi\epsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\nu$] $\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{o}\sigma\omicron\nu$
 $\tau\tilde{\omega}$ $\tau\tilde{\omega}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\kappa\omega\tilde{\nu}$

Philippson then says it follows that the plural means "the greatest good and the greatest evil", and that the title does not mean "various views about finis". Poncelet quotes J. Martha:

Le titre...De finibus devrait suffire, puisque "finis" est l'équivalent de $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ et que $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ a, entre autres significations, celle de souverain bien. "Bonorum" redouble inutilement l'idée de "bien" qui est déjà dans "finis".

Martha goes on to say that malorum does not belong because finis, like τελός, implies the idea of "le but" and cannot apply to evil. However, Poncelet opposes this view with the argument that finis means τελός, but not in every sense. Finis does not include the idea of bonum and therefore malorum is not contradictory. Hirzel also understands finis to have a broader meaning than the usual, absolute meaning of τελός, in that it is simply an end, limit, or extreme. The fact that finis is used as the equivalent of extremum and ultimum, which are themselves ordinarily neutral terms, would seem to support this.

On the other hand, in consideration of the aim of a happy life, which I have discussed on pages 11 and 12, finis does seem to have an absolute meaning of the ultimate goal, in which case bonorum is redundant and malorum is either contradictory or extends the meaning to include the opposite of the greatest good, which is the greatest evil. The following passages from De Finibus about the purpose of the work bear out this view:

I 11

...quod his libris quaeritur, qui sit finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum quo sint omnia bene vivendi recteque faciendi consilia referenda; quid sequatur natura ut summum ex rebus expetendis, quid fugiat ut extremum malorum?

The emphasis here is on the search for a good life, with the avoidance of evil being one of the means to this. Finis is regularly explained as that to which all things are referred and which is in accordance with nature.

I 29

Quaerimus igitur quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam.

Here bonorum is mentioned alone without malorum. As In I 42, and III 26, where finis is absent, extremum and ultimum do not stand alone without the addition of bonorum. Perhaps this is an indication that finis does have an absolute connotation while extremum and ultimum do not.

I 42

Quoniam autem id est vel summum vel ultimum vel ~~extremum~~ bonorum (quod Graeci nominant) quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes, fatendum est summum esse bonum incunde vivere.

Cicero defines τέλος in the absolute, positive sense, meaning the ultimate aim - a good life, in the same terms as he defines finis in II 5.

II 4

Quaerimus enim finem bonorum;...

Again only the positive side is mentioned in connection with the main purpose of the book.

II 5

Nam hunc ipsum sive finem sive extremum sive ultimum definiebas id esse quo omnia quae recte fierent referrentur neque id ipsum usquam referretur.

This also implies one single, ultimate goal, i.e, an absolute τέλος.

III 26

Cum enim hoc sit extremum (sentis enim, credo, me iam diu quod τελός Graeci dicunt^o id dicere tum extremum, tum ultimum, tum summum; licebit etiam finem pro extremo aut ultimo dicere) cum igitur hoc sit extremum, congruenter naturae convenienterque vivere,...

Here Cicero specifically equates finis, as well as extremum, ultimum, and summum, with

V 23

Nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur quod diximus naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur,...

Although malorum is expressed here, it can only be bonorum which is in accordance with nature and which is desired for its own sake. Therefore Cicero seems to have restricted the meaning of finis to be closer to the absolute τελός. The title can then mean "about the ultimate good (and incidently the ultimate evil)". The following statement suggests that "the end(s) of evil" is simply a corollary to "the end(s) of good". It also implies that Cicero does not mean one ultimate good, but various possible ultimate goods:

Acad. II 132

Iam illud perspicuum est, omnibus his finibus bonorum quos exposui malorum fines esse contrarios.

A meaning of "various views about the ultimate good (and evil)" can be supported by the fact that different views of various philosophers are discussed as Cicero says:

I 12

Nos autem hanc omnem quaestionem de finibus bonorum et malorum fere a nobis explicatam esse his litteris arbitramur, in quibus, quantum potuimus, non modo quid nobis probaretur sed etiam quid a singulis philosophiae disciplinis diceretur persecuti sumus.

On the other hand, in works other than De Finibus, some statements do suggest a simple meaning of "the chief good and the chief evil":

Acad. 114

...tantum tibi adroges ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas, mores fingas, fines bonorum malorum constituas,...

De Off. I 5

Sed sunt non nullae disciplinae, quae propositis bonorum et malorum finibus officium omne pervertant.

Clearly then, while the Latin word finis means only a limit without including an idea of a goal or positive aim, Cicero has in mind this connotation from the Greek word $\tau\epsilon\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$. His chief purpose seems to be to discover the ultimate evil. As for the title, bonorum et malorum is necessary to explain finis, which in Latin would not make sense alone.

Although it is not always possible to be certain what Cicero's sources were and just how closely he followed them, nevertheless he gives enough clues to enable scholars to make reasonably accurate conjectures. In Chapter II on Cicero's method of composition, I indicated that Cicero does not necessarily translate verbatim, neither does he reject either translating or paraphrasing where he finds it convenient. I also tried to show that Cicero wanted to present a variety of opinions on a given topic. So, the entire work De Finibus is very likely to have a background of several different sources. Each chapter may come from one source or may be compiled out of more than one. For the following reasons then, it is indisputable that Cicero's philosophical works do not consist mainly of his own original thoughts:

1. He says he will give varying views of different schools.
2. He does so; there are many references to other philosophers and their opinion; each work (such as De Fin., De Nat. Deor., Tusc.) is divided into headings discussing the various views of the different schools on a given topic.
3. Many of the criticisms which Cicero uses in Books I and II of De Fin. under his own name have been expressed by other Greeks.

PART II

CICERO'S SOURCES

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF THE SOURCE OF BOOK I

R. Hirzel fully discusses¹⁴ the possible and probable sources for all of Cicero's philosophical works. I will give a commentary of his theories on De Finibus I, along with my own arguments.

In order to prove that Cicero did not work out his thoughts and material himself, Hirzel uses a major fact: that books I and II do not correspond as to subject matter; and to this he adds various supporting proofs for II, and tries to demonstrate a polemic purpose in I which could not come from Cicero. These I will discuss more fully in the course of this chapter.

I will begin discussing that correspondence. Clearly books I and II do not correspond as to the order of topics; and points are brought up in one book which are not mentioned in the other.¹⁵ A careful reading of II will demonstrate that it is not really a point by point answer to Torquatus' arguments, but rather a discussion and criticism of Epicureanism, with some comparison to other philosophers. A summary of both books will help to illustrate these points:

I

<u>1 - 16</u>	Cicero's defense of philosophy, and introduction.
<u>17 - 26 viii</u>	Cicero's criticism of Epicureanism.
17 - 21	Epicurus is unoriginal in Natural Science
	Epicurus lacks scientific knowledge.
22	Epicurus disregards logic.
23 - 25	Pleasure and pain are not the main incentives for man
25	Inconsistency in Epicurus' arguments.
26	Epicurus is uneducated.
<u>26 viii - 29 ix</u>	Transitional; introduction to Torquatus' defense of Epicurus.
<u>29 ix - 54</u>	Torquatus' arguments in favor of pleasure.
29 ix - 31	Pleasure is sought instinctively.
	Pain is avoided instinctively.
30	Perception is based on the senses.
31	Other Epicurean views:
	a. perception is based on reason
	b. truth is found by argument and discussion
32 - 36	Some pain may be accepted to gain greater pleasure; aim is greatest total amount of pleasure over pain.
37 - 39	Greatest pleasure is absence of pain; there is no middle state, no degrees of pleasure.
<u>40 - 42 xiii</u>	Pleasure is the chief good; pain is the chief evil
42 xiii - 54	Virtues are subordinate to pleasure (wisdom, temperance, courage, justice).
45	The classes of desires

I con't

55 - 57 xviii

Mental pleasures and pains are based on bodily ones;
mental pleasures and pains are more intense.

57 xviii - 63

...quod videamus esse finitum life of an Epicurean

57 xviii - 61

A life ruled by Epicurean doctrine is better than
one not.

60

Superstition and fear of death are evils.

62 - 63

...esse finitum. the wise man is little influenced
by fate, but controls his own life.

63

Indialectica autem...-64...poterimus sensuum iudicia
defendere. logic is useless, natural science is all
important.

64

Quidquid porro animo...-65...perception is based on
the senses.

65 - 70

On friendship .

71 - 72

Conclusion

II

<u>1 - 3</u>	Introduction
<u>3 - 17</u>	Cicero's criticism of Epicureanism.
4 - 30	Epicurus does not use dialectics and is inconsistent.
4 - 20	Epicurus does not define terms.
9 - 20	Pleasure is not the same as absence of pain.
20 - 25	Against sensualism.
26 - 27	Against Epicurus' classification of desires.
27	Desires are evil.
28 - 30	Epicurus disregards Dialectic and Logic; he is inconsistent.
31 - 77	Virtues as opposed to pleasure.
31 - 35	Self-preservation, not pleasure, is the first instinct.
36 - 37	Reason, not senses, judge perceptions; wisdom and virtues help .
38 - 43	Honestum must be part of the chief good; there is no place for pleasure.
40 - 41; 45	The nature of man; pleasure is not worthy of man.
43 - 77	Virtues as opposed to pleasures; man is led to virtue by reason (wisdom, justice, courage, temperance).
78 - 85	On friendship.
86 - 95	On happiness.
88	Pleasure can be increased.
89	Pleasures are controlled by fortune, not the wise man.
90 - 91	If the senses judge, then pleasure must have degrees, of which the senses will chose the greatest.

II con't

92 - 95	Against Epicurus' theories on pain.
96 - 110	Epicurus' letter to Hermarchus; it proves that his actions are inconsistent with his theories.
104 - 108	All pleasures are not derived from the body; memory can play not part in pleasure.
109-- 110	virtue must be a part of the chief good.
111 - 117	Man is too noble to seek pleasure alone.
<u>118 - 119</u>	Conclusion

While Torquatus in I narrows his topic to ethics, Cicero in II narrows his even further to discuss mainly virtue, which actually comprises section 37 -77 and again 104-117. He also spends much time criticizing Epicurus' lack of definition and use of logic, and his inconsistencies, especially in 3-20, 28-30, 93-103. This leaves relatively little space to discuss Torquatus' various points, mainly: 20-27, 30-36, 78-92. As far on as 44, Cicero says: "Itaque eo...constituo accedam ad omnia tua, Torquate, nisi memoria forte defecerit". To this must be added Cicero's criticism in I 17-26, in which he discusses Epicurus' physics and logic, and refutes the theory of pleasure as the sole aim. Torquatus' whole exposition revolves around pleasure as the chief good and sole goal, with various proofs and subsidiary points. It can be argued that this large-scale view of the topics in I and II is quite natural; that since the topic is "de finibus", which Torquatus finds in pleasure, he will discuss pleasure; and which Cicero finds in virtue, and not pleasure, he will discuss virtue as opposed to pleasure. Such a structure could apply whether Cicero used his own organization or not.

It is true that an exposition refutation form of philosophical argument, such as is found in books I and II of De Finibus, most naturally calls for a point by point refutation. However, it does not necessarily need to be so. In this particular instance Cicero may have brought in new quotations from Epicurus to illustrate that he was arguing from Epicurus' own tenets, to show that he himself was familiar with Epicurus' reasoning, and to strengthen his own arguments. Indeed, one of Cicero's main criticisms is inconsistency, and to prove this he must not necessarily keep Torquatus' order of discussion.

A good example is the letter to Hermarchus by which Cicero illustrates that Epicurus did not live by those beliefs which he, and Torquatus, put forward. Furthermore, a purpose of bringing various views of different philosophers to the general public could easily call for a loose treatment of subject such as a general outline of Epicurean philosophy in I; (note brief discussion of Physics and Logic, then Ethics), and a more specific treatment of ethics in II with several summaries of other's views. On reading book II, it is easy to see that despite references to Torquatus the whole discussion is not a point by point refutation of Torquatus, but a discussion of Epicureanism. This in spite of the fact that Torquatus ends book I with: "Explicavi, ...sententiam meam et eo quidem consilio, tuum iudicium ut cognoscerem." On the other hand, this statement may be seen as a perfect invitation to a more general discussion. Again and again Cicero speaks of "what Epicurus says". In this light book II can be seen as a specific criticism and discussion of Epicurean ethics, as well as some brief comparisons to other philosophers (19, 39-43). After all the main points have been discussed, as a conclusion to the criticism, Cicero brings in the letter to Hermarchus to illustrate inconsistencies. In this light, the consistencies are more impressive than the inconsistencies. Cicero has slipped from a criticism of logical inconsistencies, that is inconsistencies in Epicurus', arguments, to practical inconsistencies or inconsistencies between his doctrines and his practise. Such an organization could apply whether Cicero used his own organization or not. One must not forget either Cicero's method of writing quickly and prolifically, a method which could handle an overall purpose and general outline but would account for minor inconsistencies.

It will now be productive to study some of the specific inconsistencies.

Hirzel gives a list of Torquatus' points which are specifically answered by Cicero. However, this list, as he points out,¹⁶ makes quite clear that the order of topics is different in I and II. Furthermore, some of Epicurus' teachings which are mentioned in II, do not appear in I. As examples, Hirzel gives¹⁷ Epicurus' remark in 48; the passage quoted from the *κνριαί δοξαί* (II 21); the letter to Hermarchus (II 90); Epicurus' testament (II 101); also the passage from the *κνριαί δοξαί* (II 100) concerning death. Death and superstition, as Hirzel points out¹⁸ are mentioned only in passing by Torquatus (40, 49, 60) but I do not agree with Hirzel that this fact excludes a criticism of it by Cicero in II. Cicero could well pick up and enlarge upon such a point which Torquatus quickly passed over. Epicurus' theories on death and superstition are especially relevant in a passage criticizing several inconsistencies between Epicurus' life and philosophy as found in his letter to Hermarchus, a last testament. Another example which Hirzel gives is that Cicero criticizes Epicurus for putting all judgement in the senses (II 36) with no recognition of I 31 where Torquatus mentions that some Epicureans believe that reason has some part in the judgement of good and bad.¹⁹ Again, Hirzel's point is weak, since Cicero is speaking of Epicurus (35-6): "Epicurus...ait ...", while Torquatus says (31); "Sunt autem quidam e nostris..meaning some as opposed to most Epicureans who place full trust in the senses (I 30).

Hirzel gives²⁰ further proofs that book II is not Cicero's own, to refute the contention proposed by Madvig, that book II is freer than most of Cicero's philosophical works. He points out the many direct quotations from Epicurus and other sources which, it is true, are accurate, but which I believe can do no more than illustrate that Cicero looked up his source of quotations. He also suggests that Cicero's criticisms are not original but go back to earlier Greeks, giving²¹ the example in II 100 of Epicurus not expressing himself clearly enough in a particular passage, the same being alleged to have been given in Plutarch who in turn got it from earlier Greek sources.

Book I is rather more difficult as many scholars consider it to be incoherent, thus causing them to conjecture a compilation of several sources. Hirzel quite rightly suggests²² that such a theory can only be upheld if there is specific proof for it, otherwise it must be assumed to come from one single source. Indeed it does seem to divide itself into several sections, and contains repetitions but Hirzel explains these in another manner. He tries to demonstrate a single source, which throughout gives controversial points between the Epicureans and other schools, and in this way tries to prove that Cicero could not even have compiled the book, but closely translated the whole from a single source. Briefly, Hirzel's construction²³ runs as follows:

1. (29-54) step by step proof that pleasure is the greatest good; some arguments against Stoics.
2. (55 xviii-57) extra points; all are controversies between Epicureans and Cyrenaics.

3. (57-70) back to main Epicurean exposition

- i. 57-63 wise man compared to Stoic wise man
- ii. 63-64 dialectic and physics; against Stoics
- iii. 65-70 friendship (conclusion)-differences between Epicureans

As opposed to this coherent outline, Rackham postulates²⁴ the source to be a compendium of Epicureanism which was a summary of:

- 1. Epicurus' essay *περὶ τέλους* .²⁵ (Part I)
- 2. points between Epicureans and Cyrenaics (55 ff.)
- 3. some Epicurean work on friendship (65-70)

It serves to illustrate the diversity of views which this book suggests. Reid has a note²⁶ on the difficulties of Chapter XVII. He notes that the sentence (I 55) "Nullus...ignorant" is very abrupt. His observations lead him to the following outline of that chapter:

- i. Criticism of certain Epicurean heretics (55 Huic...sed imperitos)
- ii. Criticism of Cyrenaics (55- "quamquam autem...metuamus.)
- iii. Criticism of some unknown objectors (56)
- iv. New point in Epicurean ethics (57...xviii)

He refutes Hirzel's theory of a Cyrenaic polemic throughout this section.

I will look more closely at book I to see whether there is any possible coherence and whether that book could be a polemic, concentrating particularly on chapters other than xvii, which Hirzel treats thoroughly.²⁷ One must keep in mind, however, that a philosophical treatise need not necessarily have a systematic, unrepetitious form.

It may bring up minor arguments which may seem out of place but which do nevertheless strengthen the main argument, it may repeat arguments with different emphasis.²⁸ This study must start from I 29, Torquatus' exposition, after Cicero's introduction and criticism. According to Hirzel, 29-54 comprises one part, the main proof that pleasure is the greatest good, and this proof passes through the steps:

- i. 29-31 questions what is the greatest good, stressing the importance of instinct and the senses
- ii. 32-36 the greatest amount of pleasure over pain is sought
- iii. 37-39 greatest pleasure is absence of pain
- iv. 40-54 pleasure is the greatest good

So far the argument follows quite coherently. 29 ix is a suitable beginning:

Primum...Quaerimus igitur quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum...Hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit...idque instituit docere sic:...

After a discussion showing that living things instinctively seek pleasure, Torquatus notes two groups of Epicureans whose opinions differ somewhat (31). This is one instance of at least a comparison with other views, here with other Epicureans. Torquatus says, as if to answer an objection²⁹ (32):

Sed ut perspiciatis unde omnis iste natus error sit voluptatem accusantium doloremque laudantium, totam rem aperiam, eaque ipsa quae ab illo...dicta sunt explicato.

As an example of his theory, Torquatus returns to the same examples Cicero used of Torquatus' ancestors (123-25). Cicero explained these heroes' actions by Stoic motives of virtue. So this may support the view of a polemic against the Stoics. Torquatus concludes with (36):

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support the
les with (36):

In quo enim maxime consuevit iactare vestra se oratio, tua praesertim, qui studiose antiqua persequeris, claris et fortibus viris commemorandis eorumque factis non emolumento aliquo sed ipsius honestatis decore laudandis, id totum evertitur eo delectu rerum quem modo dixi constituto...

Whatever school Cicero actually belongs to, the description of "vestra" here clearly fits the Stoics, and coincidentally Cicero's character too. Continuing, there is a transitional reference to the later discussion of virtues (37 Erit enim iam de omnium virtutum...proprius disserendi locus) and then a discussion of the nature of pleasure is begun:

Nunc autem explicabo voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit, ut tollatur error omnis imperitorum intellegaturque ea quae voluptaria, delicata, mollis habeatur disciplina quam gravis, quam continens, quam severa sit.

The simplest explanation for the meaning of this sentence is that he will clear up common misconceptions for the layman; indeed the criticism of Epicureanism as sensual was not restricted to any one school. Yet, in keeping with the above arguments, a specific objector could be postulated, and that being the Stoic School, particularly as "disciplina gravis, continens, severa." would appeal particularly to them. A little farther, in denying the existence of a neutral state, Torquatus specifically refutes another view with these words (38):

...illud enim ipsum quod quibusdam medium videretur...

Hirzel maintains that this criticism is directed against the Stoics, while the same statement in 56 is directed against the Cyrenaics; thus Hirzel³⁰ excuses the repetition. Indeed, Torquatus goes on to refute a view of Chrysippus, beginning with the words (39):

...ut a patre audiebam, facete et urbane Stoicos irridente,...

This follows immediately and naturally on the discussion above. Finally Torquatus comes to the proof that pleasure is the greatest good. Hirzel seems to feel that the contrast between the happiest and most unhappy man (40-41) supports his theory of a polemic, simply because it proves an argument through contrast. He says:³¹

Auch hier wird der Beweis nicht sowohl positiv als in Contrasten geführt. Das Erste ist dass dem der ein kummer und sorgloses Leben hat, ein Anderer gegenübergestellt wird, der von Leiden aller Art heimgesucht ist (40f.). Deutlichen tritt die polemische Spitze in dem zweiten Beweise hervor,...

I do not find any significance in this contrast, particularly not in connection with a polemic. The man described as the happiest enjoys, of course, an Epicurean type of life. On the other hand, the most unhappy man is not described in terms of following any other philosophy of life. He is described very briefly in a general manner, of course deprived of Epicurean voluptas, as follows (41):

Statue contra aliquem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus quanti in hominem maximi cadere possunt, nulla spe proposita fore levius aliquando, nulla praeterea neque praesenti nec exspectata voluptate; quid eo miserius dici aut fingi potest?

Hirzel goes on to show a polemic purpose in Torquatus' second proof that pleasure is the greatest good, namely that virtue is not the greatest good. Hirzel's argument is stronger here since, as he points out, the proof begins (42 xiii):

Id (summum bonum) qui in una virtute ponunt et splendore nominis capti quid natura postulet non intellegunt, errore maximo, ... si Epicurum audire voluerint, liberabuntur.

Although this could merely be an objection to a common misconception, it does seem to introduce a polemic against Stoic doctrine by the references to virtue and the statement:

Istae enim vestrae eximiae pulchraeque virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabiles aut expetendas arbitraretur?

The first part of Torquatus' defence of Epicureanism, (29-54 incl.) is concluded with a final statement that pleasure is the greatest good (54). So far, the book runs coherently. One could postulate that the author uses Stoic doctrine as an object of attack against which to expound Epicureanism.

Chapter xvii, which has caused so much concern, now follows:

Huic certae stabilique sententiae quae sint coniuncta explicabo brevi.

This introductory sentence connects quite easily whatever follows with what came before. And indeed the section is brief and does discuss several secondary points. The only problem which I can see here is: why is there a sudden change from Stoic to Cyrenaic doctrine as an object of attack, if there is such a change, whether it be throughout this whole chapter or only part of it? However, I will not discuss this aspect of the problem since the question is complicated and scholars are not agreed as to the answer. I will only examine chapter xvii to see whether it fits into the work as a whole. After the above quoted transitional sentence, anything can be expected, even if seemingly abrupt, since a new section is begun. Seen in this light, the next sentence is

not as sudden as Reid thinks. The phrase "...itaque concedo quod modo dicebas..." refers back to Cicero's implication in I 25, which further ties this part of the book in with the rest. Except for the fact that the points brought up here are those in which Epicurean and Cyrenaic doctrine differ,³³ there is no impression of a distinct polemic, or of inconsistency with the rest of the book. After the digression, Torquatus returns to the main line of thought with a description of Epicurean life. (57 xviii-62) Again Epicurean doctrine is compared to Stoic (61ff.):

Multoque hoc melius nos veriùsque quam Stoici...

62 xix Sed possunt haec quadam ratione dici non modo non
repugnantibus, verum etiam approbantibus nobis.

There follows a description of the Epicurean wise man. The next section enters into a discussion of logic and natural philosophy, perhaps somewhat abruptly, but it does fit into this final description of Epicureanism, found in 57 xvii-63. In the following lines, Hirzel again suggests³⁴ that "vestra" refers to the Stoics:

In dialectica autem vestra,...

as does the statement on physics (64):

Quos qui tollunt et nihil posse percipi dicunt.

Having concluded the main line of Epicurean theory, Torquatus concludes with (65):

Restat locus huic disputationi vel maxime necessarius, de
amicitia...

This section on friendship discusses various Epicurean views and the discussion closes with (70):

Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest...etc.

The final conclusion to book I begins (71):

Quapropter si ea quae dixi sole ipso illustriora et clariora sunt...

To summarize, I think that book I as a whole is quite coherent and comprehensible. Certainly I agree with Hirzel that definite proof must be shown in order to postulate a compendium of sources, proof which is absent in my discussion. Furthermore, a polemic intention can possibly be seen throughout. However, I must emphasize that I do not consider this proven conclusively for the following reasons: there is a variance of opponents throughout book I - Stoics, Cyrenaics, and other Epicureans, as well as popular opinion; in addition to the mere contrasts which Hirzel calls polemic, such as between the happy and unhappy man in 40-41. Furthermore, I believe that these possibly are no more than objects of attack against which to expound Epicurean doctrine since it is in the nature of philosophical argument to prove one's point by disproving, and contrasting with others.³⁵ If a polemic purpose can be seen, I agree with Hirzel that the work cannot be originally Cicero's since, as I have discussed above, his own words tell us that this is not his purpose. His purpose is to state and refute the views of various schools on a given topic. If Epicureanism is refuted in book II, and stoic views are stated and refuted in books III and IV re-

spectively, it defeats the purpose to make book I a polemic against Stoicism at the same time as it states Epicurean views. Furthermore, if a polemic purpose can be seen, Cicero must have paraphrased his source quite closely since he did not disguise this polemic purpose. I use the word "paraphrase" rather than "translate" because Cicero does not translate word for word, as I have shown on pages 22-25 and will further discuss in chapter VI. Hirzel discusses³⁶ the problem of the strange word "monstrosi", found in 61. He shows that this must be an unusual translation of τερατολόγοι, brought about by a slavish, word for word translation. While his proof is very convincing, I hesitate to use this instance to prove that Cicero translates his whole source word for word. Furthermore, he definitely makes additions of his own (pp.20-23). It is useful to remember his words (De Fin. I 7):

Locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam...cum inciderit ut id apte fieri possit.

In chapter VI, I will discuss what additions Cicero makes to his source material, but before discussing Cicero's contribution, it is necessary to try to determine what the actual source for book I is.

CHAPTER V

SOURCE OF BOOK I

Scholars are not certain what the source of book I is. The one important observation to make is that the source is not Epicurus himself, but a later Epicurean. The Epicureans with differing views (31 ; 69) must necessarily be post-Epicurus and from such a late time when differing sects and groups had already developed. Mention is made several times of a view which "Epicurus would not have agreed with".

25

Nec mihi illud dixeris...Numquam hoc ita defendit Epicurus neque Metrodorus aut quisquam eorum qui aut saperet aliquid aut ista didicisset.

Metrodorus was a pupil of Epicurus.

55

...itaque concedo quod modo dicebas, cadere causa si qui e nostris aliter existimant, quos quidem video esse multos, sed imperitos.

At first glance, the source could either be Phaedrus or Zeno, since Cicero heard both of these and implies he considered them representative of Epicurus' theories (16);

"...te enim iudicem aequum puto, modo quae dicat ille bene noris." "Nisi mihi Phaedrum," inquam, "mentitum aut Zenonem putas, quorum utrumque audivi..."

Madvig considered³⁷ that this passage shows a preference for Phaedrus, a suggestion which like Hirzel, I do not think to be demonstrated, because Cicero refers equally to both. In 31, Torquatus places himself in the school which considers it necessary to argue different points

of view, a method which seems more characteristic of Zeno, since Zeno was famed as a polemic orator,³⁸ although it does not exclude Phaedrus. In I 66-70, Torquatus explains three Epicurean ways of treating friendship, stating with which one he agrees. Hirzel argues³⁹ that of the three ways, Zeno can only belong to Torquatus' group who are the firmly committed, orthodox Epicureans; thus supporting the thesis that Zeno is the source. As another possible source he suggests a follower of Zeno, which would more easily explain the varying views expressed in the book, and indeed Philodemus seems the most likely. In II 119, Philodemus is mentioned as an exponent of Epicureanism. Papyri found at Herculaneum of Philodemus' works seem to be closely followed by Cicero's de Nat. Deor., which would indicate that Cicero did use him as a source at some time.⁴⁰ The most concise conclusion which seems possible and to which Hirzel comes, is to say that the source is probably Zeno or Philodemus.

CHAPTER VI

CICERO'S ARRANGEMENT AND USE OF SOURCE MATERIAL

De Fin. I 6

Quid si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus?

This expresses Cicero's method of using and organizing his source material. He uses those parts of the source material which he needs, perhaps translating or perhaps paraphrasing. With this material he then creates a work which has unity, a beginning and an end. Introductions, conclusions, cross references, settings, characters, and parenthetical expressions, as well as language and style, make up Cicero's contribution to the philosophical works. I will demonstrate how this is done in book I of De Finibus. By noting sections of the book which must be necessarily Cicero's own writing for various reasons, and by pointing out slight differences of style between these sections and the rest of the book, I think it is possible to separate approximately the book into parts which Cicero wrote himself and parts in which he closely followed source material.

Book I begins with an introductory section which certainly is Cicero's own work and does not belong to the source material. This section covers his defense of philosophy (1 ff.), a reason for beginning with Epicureanism (13), and an introduction to the scene and characters of the dialogue (13-16). The section, which continues up to 17 "...primum totus est alienus", is full of references to Roman authors, and quotations.

It is not always possible to say exactly where Cicero finishes his own original work and where he takes up the source material. There are, however, indications which allow conjectures accurate within a sentence or two. The next sentence could be taken from the source but, as will be further demonstrated below, "inquit" and "inquam" when referring to the characters of the dialogue indicate Cicero's own writing. Therefore, the source material begins, I believe, with "Democritea dicit..." Section 1-17 up to this point clearly expresses Cicero's own views on philosophy, as it also speaks of the Roman people. Cicero as author characteristically uses the first person to express his opinions, and often uses the pluralis modestiae when referring to himself, particularly as author and philosopher:

- | | |
|----|--|
| 2 | ...eo libro quo a nobis philosophia defensa...est... |
| 3. | ...quos offendit noster minime nobis iniucundus labor. |
| 6 | Quid si nos non interpretum fungimur munere,...etc. |
| 11 | Qui autem alia malunt scribi a nobis... |
| 12 | Nos autem hanc omnem quaestionem...a nobis explicatam esse his litteris arbitramur,...etc. |
| 13 | Ut autem a facillimis ordiamus,...etc. |

Furthermore, in this section the addressee is always in the singular. So Brutus is (2): "tibi", (8) "ad te", "a te...misisti". For the setting given here a dialogue form is utilized in which the speakers are separated by "inquit" and "inquam". From this point to somewhere in 23, Cicero criticizes mainly Epicurean logic and physics, with a final

word on ethics. If Reid is right in his contention⁴¹ that something has been lost between 22 and 23, it is difficult to say something final about where Cicero leaves his source and begins his own writing. Does Cicero himself begin with a summary sentence of Epicurus' ethical views: "Confirmat autem..." etc.; or with the sentence: "Quod quamquam Aristippi...etc. which continues:

...tamen eiusmodi esse indico ut nihil homine videatur indignius. Ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et conformavit, ut mihi quidem videtur.

This idea is also expressed in II.40; 45 f.; 111; 113; therefore, these sentences could be in Cicero's source. Moreover the source author does have such affirmative phrases as, "ut mihi videtur", etc.: (18)...non probo...; (21) ...mihi nullo modo probantur..."; (22) ...ut mihi...videtur,..."; (31) "...quibus ego assentior...": (67) "...ut mihi videtur,...". Section 17 "a Democritea..." to 23 "... potest ut errem..." seems to be a continuous piece of critical prose which must have a different source from Torquatus' exposition, 29 ff.⁴² On the other hand, Cicero himself seems to hold the opinion that man is a noble creature:

II 113

Ad altiora quaedam et magnificentiora,
mihi crede, Torquate, nati sumus; etc.

It is this idea that leads him away from Epicureanism towards a stricter philosophy, and which leads him to believe that man is made for "agendum et intellegendum". Furthermore, the following statement, which must belong to Cicero, seems to belong with the other (23):

Ac fieri potest ut errem; sed ita prorsus existimo, neque cum Torquatum...etc.

The question must remain undecided except to say that somewhere in 23 is taken from Cicero's source material and that the mention of the Torquati in 23 necessarily indicates Cicero's original writing.

With the mention of the Torquati, Cicero begins a transitional section which consists of a Roman illustration of a very Roman theme: virtues and the heroic deeds of ancestors. Here Cicero discusses his main interest: ethics, and the importance of virtue. (23 to 25 "... ista didicisset.") The rest of 25 is an enlargement of the last statement and presumably the "multi" are Romans.

(
Next we have another dialogue, almost a short dramatic piece, with the speakers again designated by "inquam", "inquit". The mention of the characters Triarius and Torquatus is certainly an indication of Cicero's own writing. This dialogue serves as a transition between Cicero's criticism and Torquatus' defense and as an introduction to Torquatus' speech. Cicero says (26 viii) "Quae cum dixissem, magis ut illum provocarem quam ut ipse loquerer,..." As a preparation for the continuous prose of the source work, Torquatus is made to say: (29) "Sed uti oratione perpetua malo quam interrogare aut interrogari." Again it is rather difficult to determine exactly where Cicero finishes his own writing and returns to the source. 29 ix "Primum igitur, inquit, 'sic agam ut ipsi...placet'" belongs to Cicero. "Constituam... oratio" could belong to either. The second plural "vos" is used which, as I will point out in the course of my discussion, is used in the source work passages and indicates schools. It could, however, be

argued that here it refers to Cicero and Triarius. There is somewhat of a repetition which might indicate that the source begins at "quaerimus igitur...":

...constituam quid at quale sit id de quo quaerimus...

Quaerimus igitur quid sit extremum...

Throughout 23-29, which I have shown to be Cicero's original work, the second singular is used, as if Triarius has been forgotten:

24	...numquid tibi videtur...
25	...Quid tibi, Torquate...
25	...Nec mihi illud dixeris:...
26	...quod tibi ita videri...Quamquam te quidem video...

From 29 ix "Quaerimus" to the end of 70, with one insertion, there is a continuous prose which seems to follow one source. This exception occurs between 34 "Hanc ego cum teneam..." to 37. This section picks up Cicero's earlier examples of the Torquati from 23f., tying the whole discourse of book I together. No new points are introduced here by Torquatus, since he illustrates those points just discussed, namely instinct and the seeking of the greatest total pleasure over pain. In addition to the fact that the Torquati themselves reveal this section to be Cicero's own, we again find the second person singular as: (34) "...quos te collegisti...Quorum facta...interpretaris?" etc. An example of the plural used for schools, and the singular for

characters of the dialogue is also found: (36) "In quo enim maxime consuevit iactare vestra se oratio, tua praesertim,..." Again it is difficult to pinpoint the exact place where Cicero ends and the source begins, a fact which illustrates Cicero's great skill in composing the work. 37 xi "Sed de clarorum...satis hoc loco dictum est" referring to the Torquati, belong to Cicero, as does probably the next sentence; "Erit enim de omnium virtutum...disserendi locus", which points to a passage further on in the book (42ff.). "Nunc autem explicabo..." could belong to Cicero or the source but if we assume that the following passage is a continuation, such a statement is redundant, necessary only where Torquatus has interrupted the main flow of thought with the Torquati illustration. Therefore the next sentence probably takes up the source again, giving:

(33) Itaque earum rerum sic tenetur a sapiente delectus ut aut reiciendis voluptatibus maiores alias consequatur aut perferendis doloribus asperiores repellat. (37) (Nunc autem explicabo voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit,...etc.) Non enim hanc solam sequimur quae suavitatem aliqua naturam ipsam movet...sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus quae percipitur omni dolore detracto.

The final passage which I consider Cicero's is, as could be expected, the conclusion, which begins no later than 71, "Qui quod tibi parum videtur eruditus..." I base this conclusion on the fact that a second singular again appears indicating that the speaker is addressing one character, i.e. Cicero, and not a school or readers. It may be noted that Torquatus here answers Cicero's accusation of Epicurus' lack of education (26), a passage which I also considered as written

by Cicero himself. The former sentence (71 xxi) "Quapropter si ea quae dixi,...beatae vitae deduceret?" could again have originated with either author. It is possible to assume that the source takes up as much as seems coherent, and that Cicero adds only what is necessary to unify the whole, or to bring up a favourite point of his own. In this final section all the indications which I have cited as indicating Cicero's work are present: the second person singular - (71) "Quod tibi...videtur, (72) ...tuum iudicium; Triarius' name; and the dialogue form with "inquit". The last sentence clearly introduces book II:

Quae cum dixisset, "Explicavi", inquit, "sententiam meam et eo...consilio, tuum iudicium ut cognoscerem, quae, mihi facultas, ut id arbitrato facerem, ante hoc tempus numquam est data."

As I have already partially pointed out, it appears that passages which I considered Cicero's own, use the first singular for the author, sometimes the pluralis modestiae when referring to himself as author or philosopher, the second person usually in the singular indicating characters, and the plural only when indicating a school; in the passages I considered source material, only the first singular is found to refer to the author, and the second singular is entirely absent: the first and second plural are used only to indicate schools of thought:

- | | |
|----|---|
| 22 | Iam in altera philosophiae parte...iste vester... inermis ac nudus est. |
| 31 | Sunt autem quidam e nostris qui haec subtilius velint tradere,... |
| 32 | Sed ut perspiciatis unde omnis iste natus error sit... |

- 37 Non enim hanc solam sequimur quae suavitatem aliquam naturam ipsam movet...sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus quae...
- 42xiii Istae enim vestrae eximiae pulchraeque virtutes...
- 43 Quam autem ego dicam voluptatem iam videtis,...
- 55 Huic certae stabilique sententiae...explicabo brevi...Animi autem voluptates et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis...
- 57xviii ...videtisne quam nihil praetermittatur... Clamat Epicurus is quem vos nimis voluptatibus esse deditum dicitis,...
- 61 Multoque hoc melius nos veriusque quam Stoici.
(a particularly good illustration that the plural does mean schools.)
- 62 Sed possunt haec quadam ratione dici non modo non repugnantibus, verum etiam approbantibus nobis.
- 63 In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit esse... (See remark for 61)
- 63-64 Tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium regula, ad quam omnia iudicia rerum diriguntur, numquam ullius oratione victi sententia desistemus. etc. (The plural here could also refer to men in general.)
- 65 ...amicitia, quam si voluptas summum sit bonum affirmatis nullam omnino fore;...
- 66 Tribus igitur modis video esse a nostris de amicitia disputatum. (see remark for 61)

To summarize, there seem to be several indications of Cicero's original work and of the source material. There appears to be a difference in the use of personal pronouns, the absence of the second singular in the source and appearance of it in Cicero's passages being particularly significant. The source passages seem to be continuous monologue while Cicero's passages are in dialogue form, indicated by

mention of Torquatus and Triarius by name and "inquit", "inquam" to designate speakers. Content is interesting in the two types of material. The source passages give:

- a) 17-23, a continuous criticism of Epicureanism, and
- b) 29-71, (minus 34-37) a continuous statement of Epicurean doctrine.

On the other hand, Cicero's four original passages add to and unify the book. 23-25 brings in a typical Roman illustration for the benefit of Roman audiences, i.e. brave deeds of Roman ancestors. It further offers an opportunity for Cicero to say a few words on moral standards dear to the Roman heart and his own: patriotism, officium, honestas, and virtus. He concludes (26) with a criticism of Epicurus that he is not "satis politus iis artibus quas qui tenent eruditi appetantur", certainly a sin to someone as well-educated and who loves studies as much as Cicero. This leads into transitional passages and introduction (26-29) to the second section. The Torquati illustration is taken up by Torquatus (34-36) unifying the two sections. No new points are brought up here, former points are illustrated instead. Cicero's other two additions are a major introduction (1-17) to philosophy, de Fin. books I and II more specifically, and finally book I. Such an introduction is found in many of his philosophical works, such as the Academica, De Natura Deorum, and Orator. The second of these two additions is a conclusion, leading into book II. This conclusion contains Torquatus' answer to Cicero's criticism of Epicurus being uneducated.

One last type of addition is made by Cicero in the form of parenthetical remarks. Two examples are found of a similar kind in which Cicero gives the Greek equivalent for a word which he has translated:

- 22 Iam in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi ac disserendi, quae λογική dicitur,...
- 42 ...id est vel summum vel ultimum vel extremum bonorum, (quod Graeci τέλος nominant)....

A slightly different instance occurs in 55:

...itaque concedo quod modo dicebas cadere causa si qui e nostris aliter existimant, quos quidem video esse multos, sed imperitos...

If this statement refers to Cicero's objection in 25 as I think it must, it must be inserted by Cicero, since 25 is a passage clearly of Cicero's own. So this is another example of the unity of the whole, achieved by referring from one passage to another.

A further example of Cicero's own additions is the following. Cicero's interest in studies and his wide reading experience are indicated by the many quotations from Roman authors such as Lucilius, Ennius, and Terence. In I 4ff., Cicero compares the enjoyment of both Latin and Greek theatre to the study of both Latin and Greek philosophical works. Many authors are named, beginning with Ennius, Pacuvius, and Terence. Other quotations from Ennius are found in II 41; 106; from Terence in I 3; 14; 15; from Lucilius in I 8; II 15; 23; 24; from Caecilius Statius in I 13; 14; II 22; from Attius in II 94;

and from two unknown sources in II 18; 71. II 79 refers to a play by Pacuvius. Cicero also seems to have a fondness for proverbs: II 22, which Reid suggests⁴³ comes from the old drama; II 72; II 105; 118. All these Latin references must naturally have been added by Cicero himself. I 4ff. names many Greek authors along with their Latin imitators. In II 116, famous Greeks are named as subjects which Cicero pleads Romans not to read about before his own countrymen. Calatinus is mentioned as a Roman hero (II 117).

Cicero makes many references to actual Romans or Roman incidents. I have already discussed the Torquati illustrations in the course of this chapter. (I 23; 34-5; II 105 - Manlius T.). There are references to presumably well-known traits of certain people: Manius Curius (II 30), Gallonius and Piso (II 90), Gaius Marius (II 105). In a discussion of virtues as opposed to pleasure, Cicero mentions several court cases and other Roman incidents: II 54; 55; 56; 57; 58; 61; 65-6; 70; 72. And in II 93 Cicero relates an incident in his own personal experience, the illness of a friend, to serve as an example that long pain is not necessarily light.

The question to be answered then is: how much of the work is Cicero's own? expresses his own feelings? The answer is largely found in my previous discussion. Even if he does not specifically state his own views, his prejudices and interests are certainly evident, first of all in his choice of subject matter and source. Cicero does not show much interest in physics or logic in any of his philosophical works, De Finibus included. True, he briefly discusses the atomic

theory, and dialectics as an introduction to Epicurean doctrine. But he immediately goes on into an illustration of virtue in the practical life of soldiers and statesmen (the Torquati) and books I and II continue with a discussion of ethics. Secondly, for Romans, and for Cicero, philosophy as an ivory-tower study was of no use. It had to serve a practical purpose as a guide to living for ordinary people.⁴⁴ Cicero does occasionally state his preferences and his personal views (see my final conclusion), but beyond this one must remember his purpose of presenting the Roman people with a Latin version of differing philosophical theories, not necessarily his own. In addition, Cicero's personal contribution is the development of philosophical expression in Latin, his style, and the form in which he sets his philosophical writing.⁴⁵ Now I will turn to Cicero's language.

PART II

SOME OBSERVATIONS OF CICERO'S LANGUAGE

IN BOOKS I AND II OF DE FINIBUS

CHAPTER VII

LANGUAGE

Cicero, a master of the Latin Language, enriched that language by making philosophical expression an integral part of it. Against any dissenters, he confidently states that Latin is as rich a language as Greek, if not more so:

De Fin. I 10

...ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiolem etiam esse quam Graecam.

Ibid. III 5

Et quoniam saepe diximus, et quidem cum aliqua querela non Graecorum modo, sed eorum etiam qui se Graecos magis quam nostros haberi volunt, nos non modo non vinci a Graecis verborum copia sed esse in ea etiam superiores,...

De Nat. Deor. I 8

Complures enim Graecis institutionibus eruditi ea quae didicerant cum civibus suis communicare non poterant, quod illa quae a Graecis accepissent Latine dici posse diffiderent: quo in genere tantum profecisse videmur at a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur.

This is rather an extravagant boast of Cicero's and need not necessarily be accepted.

Cicero's contribution lies not so much in inventing as in establishing philosophical terminology in Latin. The words and expressions he uses may be divided as follows:

- a. new philosophical words and expressions
- b. other means of expressing abstract thought.

The words and terms fall into three main categories:

- i. transliterated Greek words, especially technical terms.
- ii. new Latin words, especially verbal nouns.
- iii. standard Latin words given special meanings.

I will list the words and expressions alphabetically and will indicate into which category each belongs by following it with the appropriate number in brackets (i, ii, or iii). Cicero himself mentions the importance of having a technical vocabulary for any specialized subject:

De Fin. III 3-5

Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus, idque cum Graecis, tum magis nobis quibus etiam verba parienda sunt imponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. Quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur, cogitans in omni arte cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit multam novitatem nominum esse cum constituentur earum rerum vocabula quae in quaque arte versantur. Itaque et dialectici et physici verbis utuntur iis quae ipsi Graeciae nota non sint,...Quin etiam agri cultura,...tamen eas res in quibus versatur nominibus notavit novis. Quo magis hoc philosopho faciendum est; ars est enim philosophia vitae, de qua disserens arripere verba de foro non potest:...

He also states that, although in his opinion Latin has as rich a vocabulary as Greek, he will use technical, transliterated Greek words, which have already become well established in Latin.

Words and Expressions

amotio doloris (ii) I 37, II 9.

syn.: detractus dolor II 10.
dolore carere I 8; II 29.
indolentia II 11; 19.
liberatio molestiae I 37.
nihil dolere II 8; 11; 22.
non dolere II 9; 11; 16; 19; 28; 31.
non dolendi status II 28; 32.

privari dolore I 37.
privatio doloris I 37; 38; II 28.
sine dolore esse II 20.
vacuitas doloris II 16; 19.
-used most frequently.
vacuitas molestiae I 37.
-omnis is never used with vacuitas, but usually
with the others.
voluptas nihil dolendi II 28; 32.

ἄλυπία; ἀποχλησία; ἀ.ονία; μὴ ἔλγεῖν-
most frequent.

Cicero uses a variety of expressions (such as 'freedom from pain', 'having no pain', 'removal of pain', 'freeing of pain') to render the single Epicurean concept of 'freedom from pain'.

Astra (iii) I 72

= scientia astrorum.
= ἀστρονομία
= astronomy

atomus (i) I 17; 19-20

syn. corpora individua propter soliditatem I 17.
individua et solida corpora I 18.
individua, subst. II 75.
also, corpusculum Acad. I 6.

= ἄτομος Epic. E. p. I 41-45, 54-59, 61-62, 65; Fr. 7;
Vit. 28

= σώματα Ep. I 39 ff.

cf. τὰ ἄτομα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ μεστὰ Ep. I 42.

= atoms, i.e. indivisible and solid bodies

corpora (iii)

see atomus

decretum (iii) II 28

= δόγμα
= a philosophical doctrine

definire (iii) II 30

= Definition

definitio (iii) I 22; II 5; III 40

freq. only in Cicero.

II 5 Atique haec patefactio quasi rerum opertarum, cum quid quidque ait aperitur, definitio est.

= Logical Definition.

detractus dolor (iii)

see amotio doloris

dialectica, n. pl., (i) II 17; 18; III 5.

cf. I 17 dialecticae (i, ii) captiones:

-cf. ὀνομάτων θηρεύσεις Plato Theaet. 166c.⁴⁶

=

= Logic.

disserendum (iii) 122; III 40

usually found along with quaerendum.

cf. I 31 for ordinary meaning of arguing, discussing.

V 9 Sed est forma eius (philosophia) disciplinae, sicut fere ceterarum, triplex: una pars est naturae, disserendi altera, vivendi tertia.

I 22 Iam in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi ac disserendi, quae λογική dicitur, ... Tollit definitions; nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet; ...

III 40 ...nullis enim partitionibus, nullis definitonibus utuntur, ...itaque...non multus est apud eos disserendi labor.

= λογική, διλεκτική

= Logic, Dialectic, art of reasoning.

dividendum (iii) I 22

used in compound phrase with partiendum.

= διαιρέσεις

= division

dividere (iii) II 26; 30

see dividendum

dolore carere (iii)

see amotio doloris

imago (iii) I 21

= ἔκδωλον Epic. Ep. 146a ff.
= image

individua (iii)

see atomus

indolentia (ii)

see amotio doloris

infinitio (ii) I 21

hapax; elsewhere = infinitas (eg. Acad. II 118)

syn.: I 17 in infintio inani.

I 21 ...infinito ipsa, quam ἀπειρίαν vocant, ...
Epicurus used both ἀπειρία and ἄπειρον .
There possibly is a slight difference in his usages
in that ἀπειρία (Ep. I 45; III 116; Fr. V)
seems to have a more general meaning of infinity,
while ἄπειρον (Ep. I 60; 47b, 73, 75; II 88;
K.D. xiii) has the specific meaning of the infinite
void, the empty space in which atoms are contained.
If this is true, Cicero's statement is wrong - infini-
tio should be ἄπειρον . As such, it also
= τόπος - space (e.g. Epic. Ep. I 39);
κενόν - void (eg. Ep. I 42 ff.);
τὸ ἄπειρον κενόν - infinite void (only Ep. I 42).

initiis naturae (iii) II 38

syn.: prima data natura II 33, (in his) primis naturali-
bus II 33.

= τὰ πρῶτα περὶ φύσιν
= primary natural objects

intermundia (ii) II 75

= μεταχώσις
= cosmic interstices

iudicium (iii) I 22

= κριτήριον
= judgement

laetitia (iii)

= ἡδονή
= pleasure

In Cicero: i. voluptas = Epicurean; general
ii. laetitia, voluptas = Stoic.

I 25 ... laetitia, id est voluptatem.

These two different usages are confirmed by Cicero's own explanation (II 13), where he says that voluptas is a bodily feeling, while laetitia and gaudium are not felt bodily.

Liberatio molestiae (iii) I 37

see amotio doloris

movens voluptas (iii) II 31

syn.: voluptas in motus II 9; 16.

= ἡδονὴ ἐν κινήσει
= active pleasure

nihil dolere (iii)

see amotio doloris

non dolendi status (iii)

see amotio doloris

non dolere (iii)

see amotio doloris

partiendum (iii)

see dividendum

philosophia (i)

= φιλοσοφία
= philosophy

physica (i) I 63

= φυσική
= Natural Philosophy

prima data natura (iii)

see initiiis naturae

(in his) primis naturalibus (iii)

see initiiis naturae

privari dolore (iii) I 37; 38; II 28

see amotio doloris

privatio doloris (iii)

see amotio doloris

quaerendum (iii) I 22; II 3

see also disserendum

i. quaerendum ac disserendum I 22

= λογική
= logic, debate.

ii. (in) quaerendum II 3

cf. θεωρία (Epic. Ep. II 86)

"Φυσιολογητέον (Ibid.)

= philosophy or philosophical investigation; the art of inquiry.

rationem concludere (iii) I 22

= συλλογιζεσθαι

cp. III 27 ...e quibus effecta conclusio est...

cp. I 30; III 59 rationis conclusio

= συλλογισμός

= proof; syllogistic inference.

res occultae (iii) I 64; also IV 18; V 9; 10.

cf. III 32 ...illa quae occulta nobis sunt,...

cf. V 51 ...eorumque omnium naturae obscuritate occultantur...

= μετέωρα Epic. Ep. II 85.

cf. Epic. Ep. I 79 ...τῆς δύσεως καὶ ἀνατολῆς καὶ τροπῆς καὶ ἐκλείψεως καὶ ὅσα συγγενῇ τοῦτοις...

= natural phenomena;...

It is notable that Epicurus gives names to the natural phenomena while Cicero calls them "obscure things".

Natural Philosophy, or the explanation of physical phenomena in nature, is the basis of Epicureanism. But Cicero expresses a feeling of secrecy or mystery about them since he does not understand them or believe Epicurus' teachings. The following quotations also illustrate this, where Cicero wrongly translates the following:

K.D. X ...τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τοὺς τε περὶ μετεώρων...

as:

De Fin. II 21 deorum...metu

Here Cicero reveals his belief that the Gods are behind those natural phenomena with which Epicurus teaches that the Gods have nothing to do.

schola (i) II 1

= σχολή

= a lecture

sine dolore esse (iii)

see amotio doloris

sophistes, ae (i) II 1

= σοφιστής

= sophists

Sophistes refers to a particular type of philosopher; the Latin "homo captiosus", "captio", etc., are more general terms. II 22 - captiosa is used for σοφίσματα;

II 17 - dialecticas captiones; III 72 - captiosa (probabilitate), meaning specious. Cicero does use sapiens, not sophos; sapientia, not sophia.

stabilis voluptas (iii) II 75

syn. stabilitas voluptatis II 9,

stans voluptas II 31,

voluptas in stabilitate II 16.

= ἡδυσνή ἐν στάσει or κατὰστηματική (Fr. 1;
Vit. 136)

= "static" pleasure

stabilitas voluptatis (iii)

see stabilis voluptas

stans voluptas (iii)

see stabilis voluptas

vacuitas doloris (iii)

see amotio doloris

vacuitas molestiae (iii) I 37

see amotio doloris

voluptas (iii)

see laetitia

voluptas in motu (iii) II 9; 16.

see movens voluptas

voluptas in stabilitate (iii)

see stabilis voluptas

voluptas nihil dolendi (iii)

see amotio doloris

When Latin seems to have no single word or term which is the exact equivalent of a Greek term, or when such a term represents a difficult concept, a more elaborate expression must be used.

De Fin. III 15 ... equidem soleo etiam, quod uno Graeci,
si aliter non possum, idem pluribus ver-
bis exponere.

Cicero realizes that it is not always easy to find a one-word Latin equivalent of Greek:

Ibid. II 13 Et quidem saepe quaerimus verbum Latinum
par Graeco et quod idem valeat;...

He uses several means for fuller renderings:

- i. "quasi" to indicate a tentative translation.
These will be found under quasi.
- ii. use of synonyms or synonymous phrases.
Such synonyms may specify the expression in terms of Epicurean doctrine, such as with bene beateque vivendum, and finis, extremum, ultimum, summum; they may enlarge on a difficult idea or idea which Cicero is not sure about, such as complexiones et copulationes et adhaesiones, and vim et causam efficiendi, they may define the concept such as individua et solida corpora; or they may simply reinforce and clarify the expression.
- iii. one word as a translation followed by an explanatory "id est" clause.
These will be found under id est.
- iv. explanatory clauses other than "id est".
These take the form of a defining or explanatory clause in the case where a term alone may be ambiguous, as with mundus; where a term is used in a special meaning such as with perpaulum; or where the term itself is not sufficiently clear.

The following list is also purely alphabetical.

Other Expressions

bene beateque vivendum (ii)

a double rendering of an Epicurean concept.

= Epic. Ep. III 128 μακαρίως ζῆν

= Ibid. I 79 μακάριον

= Ibid. III 122 εὐδαιμονία

= Ibid. III 132; k. n. V ζῆν ἡδεως

= K.D. XXI τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ

= Ibid. xxvii τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα

= Fr. xvii βεβιωκῶς καλῶς

= Ibid. 85 τὸ εὐδαιμον καὶ μάκαριον

complexiones et copulationes et adhaesiones (atomorum) (iv) I 19

= περιπλοκή Epic. Ep. I 43-4.

= joining and mixing (of atoms).

(Ille atomos quas appellat)...ex quo efficiantur ea quae sint quaeque cernantur omnia... (iv) I 17

Atomos is explained.

A circumlocution of two clauses expresses "all existence".

finis, extremum, ultimum, summum (ii) I 11; 17; 29; 42; II 6.

A multiple rendering

= τελός

see also Chapter III.

id est (iii)

adds an explanatory or qualifying or specifying clause:

i. to clarify a meaning of a word,

ii. to clarify a meaning of a word in terms of Epicurean doctrine.

i. I 17 atomos...id est corpora individua propter soliditatem.

see also atomos

II 1 ...in conventu "poscere quaestionem", id est iubere dicere qua de re quis vellet audire.

quaestio = ζήτημα

posito = θέσεσιν

II 6 ...non intellegere interdum quid sonet haec vox voluptatis, id est quae res huic voci subiciatur.

= Epic. Ep. I 33 τὸ ὑποτεταγμένον τῷ φθογγῷ

- II 21 ...nec haberent ulla ex parte aliquid aut dolens aut ægrum, id est autem malum.
K.D. X ...ὅύτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν ὅύτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ἔσει το κακόν.
- II 9 Negat enim tenuissimo victu, id est contemp-
tissimis escis et potionibus,...
- II 20 ...κυρίας δόξας, id est quasi maxime
ratas,...
- ii. I 72 ...quo iucundius, id est quo melius viveremus.
I 71 ...si...oratio...fidem...sensibus confirmat,
id est incorruptis atque integris testibus,...
- II 10 Quaero autem quid sit quod, cum dissolutione,
id est morte sensus omnis exstinguatur,...
- II 100 ...mortem nihil ad nos pertinere; quod enim
dissolutum sit, id esse sine sensu sit, id
nihil ad nos pertinere omnino.
=ὁ θάνατος οὐδεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὸ γὰρ
διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ. τὸ δ ἀναισθητοῦν
οὐδεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς

infinitasque regiones, quarum nulla esset ora, nulla extremi-
tas... (iv) II 102

see innumerabiles mundos...

(in) infinito inani, in quo nihil nec suum nec infimum nec
medium nec ultimum nec extremum sit,... (iv) I 17

cp. Epic. Ep. I 60 καὶ μὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀπείρου ὥς μὲν
ἀνωτάτω ἢ κατωτάτω οὐ δεῖ κατηγορεῖν τὸ ἄνω ἢ
κάτω
see also infinitio

(illa) individua et solida corpora (ii) I 18

cp. corpora individua propter soliditatem I 17
An explanatory phrase.

(qui Epicurus) innumerabiles mundos infinitasque regiones,
quarum nulla esset ora, nulla extremitas ("mente peragravis-
set".) (ii, iv) II 102

cp. Lucret. I 74 ... omne immensum peragravit mente ani-
moque.
Double expressions and explanation of infinitasque regiones.

mundus omnesque partes mundi quaeque in eo essent. (iv) I 19

mundus = κόσμος

Mundus is reinforced to make the meaning of "the universe" definite.

percontando et interrogando (ii) II 2

= τὸ ἐλέγχειν

perpaulum, quo nihil posset fieri minus (iv) I 19

Perpaulum is defined in Epicurean terms.

quasi (i)

Indicates a tentative translation of rendering of a particular Greek word.

I 47 quasi concordia quadam

= ὁμονοία or ἁρμονία

I 39 (Nam si ea sola voluptas esset quae) quasi titillaret sensus,...

= γαργαλισμός

II 20 quasi oracula edidisse)

II 20 quasi maxime ratas)

II 102 quasi oraculum ediderit)

= χρησμοδεῖν

II 30 quasi dulcis

possibly = προσηνεῖς

(laetitia quam capiebam memoria) rationum inventorumque (nostrorum) (ii) II 96

Epic. Fr. 30, letter to Idomeneus (...χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ
τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῶν) διαλογισμῶν
(μνήμη)

...variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplficari-
que non possit. (ii) I 38

K.D. XVIII οὐκ ἀπαυξεται ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ...
ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται...
ποικιλεται is rendered doubly by variari distinguique.

vim et causam efficiendi (ii) I 18

= the cause or force (which brings about matter).

A particularly difficult passage seems to be found in I 17-21, in which Cicero discusses Epicurus' atomic theory. This section requires a number of technical terms such as atomos, corpora individua, infinito inani. In three instances Cicero gives the Greek equivalents: "images, quae ἑιδωλα nominant" (I 21); "informatio ipsa, quam ἀπειρίαν vocant". (I 21); also "Ille atomos quas appellat,..." (I 17). Many of the synonyms and explanatory clauses and phrases which I have discussed above are to be found here. There is an abundance of pronouns, particularly indefinite pronouns, used to express difficult ideas.

Law court metaphors and incidents are particularly favoured by Cicero. In I 12, Cicero contrasts the study of ethics with some more trivial discussions in law courts. Here he also names Roman people. A comparison is again made in II 3:

Omnis autem in quaerendo...oratio praescribere primum debet, ut quibusdam in formulis: ea res agatur,...

In II 36-37, senses and reason are spoken of as judges in court. Much court language is found here:

Nam quod ait sensibus ipsis iudicari voluptatem...plus tribuit sensibus quam nobis leges permittunt cum privatarum litium iudices sumus. Nihil enim possumus iudicare nisi quod est nostri iudicii; in quo frustra iudices solent, cum sententiam pronuntiant, addere: "si quid mei iudicii est"; si enim non fuit eorum iudicii, nihilo magis hoc non addito illud est iudicatum. Quid iudicant sensus?...Aequam igitur pronuntiabit sententiam ratio...

Cicero uses an example of court procedure in II 62 and 67 also:

...ut A. Varius, qui est habitus iudex durior, dicere consessori solebat, cum datis testibus alii tamen citarentur: "Aut hoc testium satis est aut nescio quid satis sit", sic a me satis datum est testium.

Quod autem patrociniū aut quae ista causa est voluptatis quae nec testes ullos e claris viris nec laudatores poterit adhibere?

Reid suggests⁴⁷ that "iudicare" is rarely used in such a purely absolute sense as in the following quotation:

I 2 Quamquam philosophiae quidem vituperatoribus satis responsum est eo libro quo a nobis philosophia defensa et collaudata est cum esset accusata et vituperata ab Hortensio. Qui liber cum et tibi probatus videretur et iis quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer,...

Since it is so used usually only when applied to "iudices", he suggests that there is a reference here to "the courts 'qualified to sit in judgement'". "Defensā" and "accusata" support this. Court language is found in other places too:

II 27 ...cupiditatis nomen servet alio,...cum de maximis vitiis loquetur tamquam capitis accuset.
This means to convict on a capital charge.

II 39 Quantum enim potero, minuam contentiones omnesque sententias simplices eorum...omnino a philosophia semovendas putabo,...
This is a legal phrase.

PART IV

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

One can not say that Cicero did not have any beliefs of his own. It is true that he did not devote himself to one school and so might be called an eclectic, but this is hardly a criticism.

Tusc. IV 7

Sed defendat quod quisque sentit; sunt enim iudicia libera: nos institutum tenebimus nulliusque unius disciplinae legibus astricti, quibus in philosophia necessario pareamus, quid sit in quaque re maxime probabile semper requiremus;...

Most of what he did believe in, came from Stoic and Academic teachings. The Academica itself and book V of De Finibus are witnesses to Cicero's approval of the Academics, as are the passages which I quoted in Part I about Cicero's disapproval of dogmatizing and his belief in the difficulty of know the truth. In De Nat. Deor. I 11, he refers to the Academica:

Qui autem admirantur nos hanc potissimum disciplinam secutos, iis quattuor Academicis libris satis responsum videtur.

Yet Cicero sometimes gets impatient with the Academics:

De Fin. II 43

...nam cum Academicis in certa luctatio est, qui nihil affirmant et quasi desperata cognitione certi id sequi volunt quodcumque veri simile videatur.

Then he prefers stricter and more traditional Stoic beliefs. In de Nat. Deor. I 3-4, for example, he gives reasons for maintaining traditional religious beliefs. He suggests that without pietas, sanctitas, and religio there would be no order to life. In De Div. II 148, he expresses the belief that it is wise to keep the religion of one's forefathers:

Nam et maiorum instituta tueri sacris caerimoniisque retinendis sapientis, est, et esse praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum caelestium cogit confiteri.

Cicero's belief in the importance of the four virtues and in officium is more nearly Roman Stoic than any other philosophy. Cicero dislikes the teachings of Epicurus because, he feels, they do not do justice to the dignity of man, and because they are "too easy":

I 13 Ut autem a facillimis ordiamur, prima veniat in medium Epicuri ratio,...

Reid has a note⁴⁹ on Cicero's scorn of Epicurus' lack of depth.

I 27 ...praesertim illa perdiscere ludus esset.

Acad. I 6 Haec ipsa de vita et moribus et de expendendis fugiendisque rebus illi simpliciter, perudis enim et hominis idem bonum esse censent,...

Tusc. IV 6 ...C. Amafinius exstitit dicens, cuius libris editis commota multitudo contulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam, sive quod invitabantur illecebris blandae voluptatis,...

It is difficult to understand what Cicero means by easy, since Epicureanism is not easy to practise. The above quotations seem to imply that it is easy to understand. Perhaps Cicero feels that the Epicurean scorn of logic makes it so. Or perhaps he feels that a philosophy based on pleasure is easy to grasp, and even easy to practise for the common man. Such an attitude would reveal Cicero's poor understanding of the philosophy.

Cicero's aversion to Epicureanism does not extend itself to Epicurus himself or any individual Epicurean, since many of Cicero's friends, notably Atticus, were Epicureans. In this way he upholds his own teachings against dogmatism and belief that each person should believe what he wishes. In the introduction to book I of De Finibus, Torquatus is made to say:

I 14 ...certe audiam, quid sit, quod Epicurum nostrum
non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt, qui ab eo
dissentiant, sed certe non probes,...

Throughout books I and II of De Finibus, Cicero makes a distinction between disapproving of Epicurus and of Epicureanism. In fact, he often defends Epicurus against those who seem to pervert his teachings:

I 15 Oratio me istius philosophi non offendit; nam et
complectitur verbis, quod vult, et dicit plane
quod intellegam;...

II 18 "Dicam", inquam, "et quidem discendi causa magis,
quam quo te aut Epicurum reprehensum velim."

II 20 Hic, qui utrumque probat, ambobus debuit uti, si-
cut facit re neque tamen dividit verbis.

II 21 "Si alia sentit", inqua, "alia loquitur, numquam
intellegam quid sentiat; sed plane dicit, quod
intellegit."

II 22 Sed tamen nonne reprehenderes, Epicure, luxuriosos
ob eam ipsam causam, quod ita viverent, ut per-
sequerentur cuiusque emodi voluptates, cum esset
praesertim, ut ais tu, summa voluptas nihil dolere?

II 28 Sed haec quidem liberius ab eo dicuntur et saepius.
Quod equidem non reprendo; est enim tanti philoso-
phi tamque nobilis audacter suum decreta defendere:
...

II 49 Philosophus nobilis, a quo non solum Graecia et
Italia, sed etiam omnis barbaria commota est,...

- II 50 Non is vir est, ut, cum honestatem eo loco habeat, ut sine ea iucunde neget posse vivi, illud honestum, quod populare sit, sentiat et sine eo neget iucunde vivi posse, aut quidquam aliud honestum intellegat nisi quod sit rectum ipsumque per si, sua vi, sua sponte natura laudabile.
- II 80 Quis, quaeso, illum negat et bonum virum et comem et humanum fuisse?
- II 81 Ac mihi quidem, quod et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei et fuerunt et hodie sunt et in amicitiiis fideles et in omnia vita constantes et graves nec voluptate, sed officio consilia moderantes, hoc videtur maior vis honestatis et minor voluptatis.
- II 99 Ita redarguitur ipse a sese, convincunturque scripta eius probitate ipsius ac moribus. Nam ista commendatio puerorum,...indicat, innatam esse homini probitatem gratuitam, non invitata voluptatibus nec praemiorum, mercedibus evocatam.
- II 102 Haec ego non possum dicere non esse hominis quamvis et belli et humani,...

So Cicero seems to respect Epicurus as a man and as a philosopher, even though he disapproves of his teachings.

Even though Eclecticism might not require great original thought, Cicero's contribution was that he made philosophical writing a part of Latin, and popularized it by his style. Not only did he translate Greek ideas, but he added Roman characteristics such as patriotism, practicality, and traditional Roman characters and incidents. His vast reading acquainted him with all the Greek sources so that he had at hand the knowledge of where to go for his information. A final quotation lets Cicero tell his purpose, which he probably achieved:

Acad. I 4 ...itaque ea nolui scribere quae nec indocti intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent...

APPENDIX

FACTS ABOUT DE FINIBUS FROM CICERO'S OTHER WORKS

De Finibus, written in 45 B.C., is amongst Cicero's last and most important philosophical works. This is what he says about it in his summary of his works found in De. Div. II 2:

Cumque fundamentum esset philosophiae positum in finibus bonorum et malorum, perpurgatus est is locus a nobis quinque libris, ut, quid a quoque, et quid contra quemque philosophum diceretur, intellegi posset.

March 16, 45 (Att. XII 12, 2) and June 30, 45 (Att. XIII 19, 4) he writes to Atticus regarding the choice of characters, saying that in order to avoid jealousy he will not use living people. On May 29 (Att. XIII 32, 3):

Torquatus Romae est.

And by June 2, book I has been sent to Atticus:

Ibid XIII 5, 1 Misi tibi Torquatum.

In a letter to Atticus from June 24, Cicero mentions that he has dedicated the work to Brutus and indicates that he is pleased with the work:

Ibid XIII 12, 3 Nunc illam περὶ τελῶν σύνταξιν
sane mihi probatam Bruto, ut tibi placuit, despondimus, idque ~~tue~~ ~~ammon~~ nolle mihi scripsisti.

By June 30 or July 1 (Ibid XII 21a, 1) the first draft of the work must have been finished and in Atticus' hands, since Cicero is annoyed that Atticus has given an unrevised copy of book V to Balbus before

Brutus, to whom the work is dedicated, has seen it. Speaking of his writings, he continues:

Etsi nunc quidem maxima mihi sunt haec; quid est enim aliud?

The work is completed and at the copyists by July 10:

Ibid XIII 23, 2

Item quos Bruto mittimus, in manibus
habent librarii.

FOOTNOTES

PART I

1. For an outline of Cicero's life, the following works are useful: "Cicero", in Plutarch's Lives; P. Boyancé, "Cicéron et la Vie Contemplative", Latomus, vol. XXVI, 1967, pp. 3-26.
2. J.S. Reid, M. Tulli Ciceronis De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, n. 3, p. 9. Cicero corresponded with Posidonius.
3. Ibid. n. 4, p. 24.
4. For a fuller discussion of Cicero's conflict between politics and philosophy, see Boyancé, "Cicéron et la Vie Contemplative".
5. De Nat. Deor. I 6, quoted on p. 1.
6. R. Y. Tyrrell, and H.C. Purser, Cicero's Correspondence, Dublin, University Press, 1899, vol. V, n. 1, p. 104.
7. Philosophy defined as "studium sapientiae" is also found in Tusc. I 1.
8. Reid, n. 4, p. 68.
9. See R.D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, p. 353 ff., and E. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 274 ff., chapters on eclecticism, for brief discussions of Philosophy becoming more practical in Cicero's age.
10. R. Philippson, "M. Tullius Cicero: Die Philosophischen Schriften", R.E., vol. XIII, 1185 ff.
11. Cicero does do this as I will show in my chapter on his language.

12. The following authors have discussions about "finis", "and the title De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum'. The references I make in my discussion are to the following pages; R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Philosophischen Schriften, vol. II, p. 662-68; R. Philippson, R.E., vol. XIII, 1135.40-1136; A. Lörcher, PhW, vol. XXXIII, 1913, p. 598-617.
13. C. Bailey ed., "Vit.", Epicurus, the Extant Remains, #27, p. 159.
14. Op. Cit., vol. II "Die Schrift de finibus bonorum et malorum, Das zweite Buch", p. 630-668; "Das erste Buch", pp. 669-90.
15. Ibid., p. 635-7
16. Ibid., p. 636, n. 1 and 2.
17. Ibid., p. 636-7, n. 3.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 637, n. 1.
20. Ibid., p. 632 ff.
21. Ibid., p. 634, n. 2, found in Gell. II. 8.
22. Ibid., p. 669.
23. Ibid., p. 675-82.
24. Op. cit., p. xiii.
25. See f.n. 12.
26. Op. Cit. p. 80, n. 6.

27. Op. cit. p. 675-82.
28. A case in point may be book II, though considered by most scholars to be from one source, seems to me to be more rambling and repetitious than book I.
29. Hirzel suggests against the Stoics, p. 679.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 673.
32. Ibid., p. 674 ff.; Reid, p. 80, no. 5.
33. Ibid., p. 675-8; Zeller, "The Cyrenaic School", in Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, p. 122-26.
34. Ibid, p. 680-81.
35. I am surprised that no one has tried to reconstruct a scheme in the manner of Homeric scholarship:
- 31 contrasts different Epicurean views
29-54 polemic against the Stoics
55-57 polemic against the Cyrenaics
57-64 polemic against the Stoics
65-70 contrasts different Epicurean views
36. Op. Cit. p. 682-87; cp. Reid, no. 4, p. 88.
37. Op. Cit. p. IV.
38. Hirzel, p. 689; Philippson, op. cit., 1136-7.
39. Ibid., p. 688-9.

40. Ibid., vol. I, p. 1-3; Reid, n. 4, p. 24; n. 3, p. 102; Hutchinson, Op. cit. p. lxxvi.
41. Op. cit. p. 35.
42. Hirzel, p. 657-8
43. Reid, n. 4, p. 131.
44. See Zeller and Hicks, chapters on Eclectics, for brief discussions of philosophy becoming more practical. See my chapter I, p. 10 ff. for a discussion of Cicero's practical attitude toward philosophy.
45. See P. Levine, "Cicero and the Literary Dialogue", C.J. ,LIII, 1958, 146-51, for a discussion of Cicero's contribution of the dialogue (dramatic) form.

PART III

46. Reid, n. 3, p. 123.
47. Ibid., n. 11, p. 2.
48. Ibid., n. 1, p. 152.
49. Ibid., n. 3, p. 20.

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B29976